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ARTICLES
Litigation as a Predatory Practice
By GARY MYERS*
INTRODUCTION
In this period of burgeoning litigation, courts and legislatures
have recognized that the filing and conduct of a lawsuit can itself
be an independent tort or wrong. Various causes of action and
remedies are now available to deter abusive litigation, including
state tort actions for abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
In federal court, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and other rules and statutes offer means of deterring frivolous
litigation and compensating injured parties.
When abusive litigation accomplishes or attempts to accomplish
an anticompetitive result, the federal antitrust laws offer yet an-
other avenue for relief. Despite the observation that antitrust claims
are generally on the decline,' the volume of antitrust cases based
on "sham" litigation has increased substantially in the last few
decades. 2 This trend is understandable in light of society's increas-
ing awareness of abusive litigation and the generous remedies avail-
able under the antitrust laws. 3
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. B.A. 1984, New York
University; M.A. (Econ.) 1986, J.D. 1986, Duke University. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
I would like to thank George Cochran and Tom Mason for their comments on an earlier
draft of this Article and Pamela Guren Bach and Angel Lawyer Morgan for their research
assistance.
I See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence L. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEo. L.J. 1001, 1002-04 (1986) (showing decline in antitrust litigation during
the 1980s). Stephen Calkins has demonstrated that courts are using summary judgment and
other methods of pretrial disposition of antitrust cases more frequently than in the past.
See Steven Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1104-61 (1986).
2 See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
I The remedies available under the antitrust laws include treble damages, costs and
attorneys' fees, see 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988), and injunctions, see 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1988). In
addition, the antitrust laws of course offer access to the federal courts, which many lawyers
and litigants view as a desirable forum in which to bring complex claims.
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Although the volume of antitrust claims alleging "sham" liti-
gation has been high, the law in the area has been unsettled and
often confusing. Some of this confusion is the result of ambiguous
language in the major Supreme Court decisions that established
the antitrust standards for sham litigation cases. These cases inev-
itably present issues concerning Noerr-Pennington immunity. The
Supreme Court established this immunity in two landmark cases,
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.4 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington.- The gist of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is that genuine efforts to influence gov-
ernmental entities are immune from liability under the antitrust
laws, even if the lobbying efforts lead to plainly anticompetitive
governmental actions. 6 In its 1972 decision California Motor Trans-
port Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,7 the Supreme Court held that
antitrust immunity extends not only to efforts to influence legis-
latures and other political bodies but also to the initiation and
conduct of lawsuits." The Court noted, however, that Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity is not absolute. Quoting Noerr, Justice Douglas
noted: "[Tihere may be instances where the alleged conspiracy 'is
a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified."' 9
Since these landmark decisions, courts and commentators have
grappled with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, attempting to distin-
guish "genuine efforts" to seek legal redress from lawsuits that
are "mere sham." As former Judge Robert H. Bork observed in
The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, "Predation
by abuse of governmental procedures, including administrative and
judicial processes, presents an increasingly dangerous threat to
competition. Antitrust law is beginning to catch up with it, but the
criteria to govern this field are not yet fully formulated."' 1 Citing
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
6 See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1961).
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
' See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-12
(1972).
, Id. at 511 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).




various commentators, Professor Gary Minda has noted that an-
titrust law in this area continues to be 'uncertain,' 'inconsistent,'
'disintegrating,' and ... an antitrust 'quagmire.' The Supreme
Court's case-by-case approach to this important area of antitrust
law has been unfruitful because adjudication has failed to raise,
let alone resolve, serious analytical difficulties at the core of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine." 11
Although the antitrust laws clearly should deter anticompetitive
litigation, the appropriate standards for doing so are uncertain.
This Article reviews and evaluates the sham litigation case law,
finding that many courts have allowed immunity too readily or on
inappropriate grounds. It attempts to develop comprehensive stan-
dards for antitrust claims based on sham litigation. In Part I, this
Article surveys the Supreme Court precedent in the Noerr-Pen-
nington area. Part II examines the economic literature on predation
and provides an economic framework for evaluating sham litigation
as a form of predatory behavior. The economic analysis in that
Part indicates that predatory litigation can serve a number of
anticompetitive purposes, that it may be more effective than other
forms of predation, and that it can be assessed using a cost-benefit
test.
Part III assesses the principal issues that have troubled the
courts in evaluating exclusionary litigation cases. The issues in-
clude: (1) whether predatory litigation must be frivolous or meet
some other standard of baselessness; (2) whether abusive litiga-
tion must give rise to "access barring" in order to overcome
Noerr-Pennington immunity; (3) what the role of anticompetitive
or other improper motives is under Noerr-Pennington; (4) whether
a pattern of baseless litigation is required or whether one lawsuit
suffices to establish an antitrust violation; and, (5) what the
proper standard of pleading and proof is for sham litigation.
Part III includes proposed standards that address these unsettled
issues and provides a framework for evaluating antitrust cases
alleging abusive litigation. The standard draws heavily from Rule
11, other federal law, and state tort standards for abusive liti-
gation, while giving consideration to the competing First Amend-
ment and antitrust values that underpin Noerr-Pennington.
" Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reas-
sessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HAsTiNGs L.J. 907, 910 (1990).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court first established antitrust immunity for
efforts to petition the government in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.12 In Noerr, a group of
truck operators and its trade association filed an antitrust suit
against twenty-four railroads, a railroad trade association, and a
public relations firm. The truckers claimed that the defendants
had conspired to restrain trade in and to monopolize the long-
distance freight business, in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.'3 The truckers alleged that the defendants were
engaging in a lobbying and publicity campaign designed to dis-
credit the trucking industry and to encourage the passage of laws
harmful to them. According to the truckers, the sole purpose of
this campaign was to destroy them as competitors in the long-
distance freight business. The lobbying was also alleged to be
deceptive, because the railroads used the "third-party tech-
nique," sponsoring publicity that falsely appeared to originate
from independent third parties.1 4
After conducting extensive hearings, the district court found
that the defendants had violated the Sherman Act, given the
improper motivation of their lobbying efforts and the deceptive
nature of the third-party technique. A divided court of appeals
affirmed the district court's findings. 5
Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, re-
versed, holding that the defendants had not violated the Sherman
Act.' 6 The opinion rested on two principal grounds. First, as a
.2 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
, Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988)).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides as follows:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony .....
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1988)).
'4 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129-30. For a discussion of the deceptive lobbying techniques
employed by the railroads, see Minda, supra note 11, at 914-18.
1S Noerr, 365 U.S. at 132-35.
16 Id. at 145.
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matter of statutory interpretation, Justice Black noted that the
Sherman Act does not apply to valid exercises of governmental
power. 17 Thus, otherwise unlawful actions mandated by the fed-
eral government or by the states do not violate the Sherman
Act. 18 Because the Sherman Act does not reach these possibly
anticompetitive governmental actions, it should not reach a pri-
vate party's legitimate efforts to urge the government to take
such an action. 9 In the Court's view, these lobbying efforts are
essentially dissimilar to the types of anticompetitive behavior
normally condemned under the Sherman Act; the Sherman Act
regulates business activity, not political activity.
In addition to this legislative interpretation, the Court rested
its decision on a second ground. Justice Black observed that the
Sherman Act would create serious constitutional problems if the
Court interpreted it to reach the railroad's lobbying efforts. 20 Le-
gitimate lobbying efforts fall squarely within the protections of the
First Amendment right to petition government, 21 and the Court
See id. at 136.
Regarding federally mandated actions, this principle was established in United States
v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1939) (holding that agriculture secretary's
order, issued pursuant to federal statute, did not violate the Sherman Act even if it fixed
prices and resulted in a monopoly). As for actions mandated by the states, see Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943) (holding that, as a valid exercise of its legislative
authority, state's agricultural prorate program did not violate the Sherman Act). The scope
of Parker v. Brown immunity has been the subject of numerous later cases. See, e.g., City
of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., U.S. __, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991)
(holding that authority given to city by state to regulate land use and buildings included
authority to displace competition); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)
(holding that anticompetitive conduct at issue fell within the "state action" exemption to
the federal antitrust laws); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48 (1985) (holding collective rulemaking activities, although not compelled by the
respective states, immune from federal antitrust liability under the state action doctrine);
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (holding that when a state legislature adopts
legislation, its actions are exempt from operation of the antitrust laws); California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (holding that state
policy must be clearly articulated and actively supervised to gain exemption from federal
antitrust laws); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)
(holding that state action exemption does not automatically exempt cities from the operation
of the antitrust laws).
For the Court's latest discussion of the interaction between Noerr and Parker, see
infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
1" Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
See id. at 137-38.
21 The First Amendment, in pertinent part, provides as follows: "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging ... the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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was unwilling to interpret the Sherman Act in a manner that would
trample on that right.22
Having established the limits of the Sherman Act-both legis-
lative and constitutional-the opinion proceeded to determine
whether the defendants had done anything that could properly be
condemned under the Sherman Act. Justice Black focused first on
the assertion that tho defendants' sole purpose in conducting their
lobbying efforts was to destroy the trucking industry as a compet-
itor in long-distance freight hauling. The Court's unqualified re-
jection of this argument is relevant to any assessment of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in govern-
ment of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement
of laws cannot properly be made to depend on their intent in
doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action
on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to
themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors .... Indeed,
it is quite probably people with just such a hope of personal
advantage who provide much of the information upon which
governments must act. A construction of the Sherman Act that
would disqualify people from taking a public position on matters
in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the
government of a valuable source of information and, at the same
time, deprive the people of their right to petition in the very
instances in which that right may be of the most importance to
them.Y
22 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38. Commentators have debated whether Noerr is based
solely on an interpretation of the Sherman Act in light of First Amendment considerations
or whether Justice Black actually reached the constitutional issue. Compare Daniel R.
Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and
Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 80, 84 n.32 (1977) (arguing
that later precedents indicate Noerr resolved the First Amendment issue) with Milton
Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, 73 CoLuM. L. REv. 415, 434-35 (1973) (arguing
that Noerr did not reach the constitutional issue) and Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The
Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases,
36 STAN. L. REv. 1243, 1250 & n.33 (1984) (same). The Court's opinion in California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972), expressly states that Noerr
rests on both Sherman Act and First Amendment grounds.
In addition to the tight to petition, the First Amendment freedom of association
would seem to protect the defendants' tight to gather and to confer among themselves for
the purpose of petitioning the government. For a discussion of the free association aspects
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see Fischel, supra, at 97-98; see also Litton Sys., Inc. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 806 n.29 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting free association
aspects of Noerr).
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139.
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Thus, even assuming that the defendants' lobbying efforts were
motivated solely by anticompetitive purposes,u their actions were
immune from liability under the Sherman Act. This analysis, which
is difficult to dispute in the context of lobbying, presents one of
the difficult issues that courts have faced in assessing when "sham"
litigation violates the Sherman Act-the role of intent in applying
the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.2
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the defendants'
use of the third-party technique rendered their actions unlawful.
Justice Black agreed that the tactic was both unethical and decep-
tive, but noted that if the Sherman Act establishes a code of ethics
at all, "it is a code that condemns trade restraints, not political
activity.''26 Hence the use of the third-party technique as part of
the defendants' lobbying efforts did not violate the Sherman Act.
The Court next addressed petitioning immunity in United Mine
Workers v. Pennington,27 the other decision that gave its name to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. There, the United Mine Workers
("UMW") retirement fund sued Phillips Brothers Coal Company
and its owners, seeking to recover payments owed to the fund
under a wage agreement. Phillips responded that the UMW and
certain large coal companies had conspired to restrain and monop-
olize commerce in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. The UMW's wage agreement allegedly had the effect
of squeezing out small coal producers, such as Phillips. The large
coal companies and the UMW, acting jointly, had successfully
persuaded the Secretary of Labor to adopt a high minimum wage
for employees of companies selling coal to the Tennessee Valley
Authority ("TVA"). They also had approached TVA officials,
persuading them to change the TVA's coal purchasing policies in
a manner detrimental to small coal operators.2
The jury rendered a verdict, which was upheld by the court of
appeals, against the UMW. The Supreme Court, after determining
that the labor exemption did not apply to the agreements between
2' See id. at 138 n.18. Justice Black assumed that the district court's finding of
anticompetitive purpose was correct even though he viewed the evidence on this point as
being weak at best.
' See infra notes 198-232 and accompanying text.
2 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
See id. at 659-61.
1991-92]
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the UMW and the large coal operators, 29 reached the Noerr-Pen-
nington issue. The Court applied the immunity announced in Noerr
to the defendants' attempts to influence the actions ofthe Secretary
of Labor, TVA administrators, and executive branch and agency
officials.30 In addition, Justice White's majority opinion reaffirmed
the principle that an anticompetitive purpose does not vitiate the
immunity: "Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate
the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.
Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a
broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act.''31
The Supreme Court's next major decision-and the one central
to sham litigation issues-was California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited,2 which involved a dispute between two com-
peting groups of trucking firms. The complaint alleged that the
defendant truckers had conspired to monopolize and restrain trade
by preventing and delaying the plaintiffs' efforts to apply for,
transfer, and register carrier operating rights. The defendants ac-
complished their objective by filing lawsuits in state and federal
court, including applications for review of agency decisions, ap-
peals, and court rehearings. The defendants sought dismissal of
the suit based on Noerr-Pennington immunity. 33
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court began by noting that
immunity for petitioning executive and legislative officials is based
on two grounds: (1) a legislative interpretation of the Sherman Act
as reaching business but not political activity and (2) a constitu-
tional constraint on the antitrust laws based on the right to peti-
tion. 34 Not surprisingly, the Court found that immunity for
petitioning activity should extend to efforts seeking redress in the
courts. 3- Still, the immunity is not absolute:
2 See id. at 661-69. Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart, dissenting from the
opinion but concurring in the result, believed that the labor exemption for collective
bargaining activity protected the UMW's actions from antitrust scrutiny. See id. at 700-735.
See id. at 669-72.
" Id. at 670. Justice White noted that evidence of this type might still be introduced
to show the purpose and character of the defendants' actions. See id. at 670 n.3.
32 404 U.S. 508.
" See id. at 509.
14 See id. at 510.
" The Court stated:
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of
petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating
the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies
and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution




We said ... in Noerr that there may be instances where the
alleged conspiracy "is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the busi-
ness relationships of a competitor and the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified. 316
The difficult question, of course, is distinguishing "sham"
litigation from legitimate claims and defenses. The Supreme Court
offered some criteria for defining litigation immunity, as distin-
guished from immunity for lobbying of legislators and executive
branch members. Most importantly, the Court noted that the pur-
poses of the present defendants' litigation strategy, as alleged in
the complaint, were to drive out competitors, create barriers to
entry, and establish a monopoly. Even though Noerr and Penning-
ton had indicated that a party's anticompetitive purpose or intent
would not vitiate the immunity for lobbying efforts, the Court
held that predatory litigation strategies were not immune from the
Sherman Act. 37
Unfortunately, rather than offering widely applicable guide-
lines, the Court offered fact-specific situations in which the sham
exception to Noerr-Pennington would apply. First, on the facts of
California Motor Transport, the Court concluded that the com-
plaint sufficiently alleged sham because it alleged predatory intent
combined with "access barring.1 38 Rather than being an attempt
to influence public officials, the defendants' actions allegedly
"sought to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adju-
dicatory tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process. It
is alleged that [the defendants] 'instituted the proceedings and
actions ... with or without probable cause, and regardless of the
merits of the cases.' -39 The defendants' unethical conduct and
intent, which might be tolerated in the lobbying arena, would not
be protected in the adjudicatory context.
Second, the Court offered examples of conduct, other
than "access barring," that would not be immune under Noerr-
Pennington: perjury of witnesses, use of a fraudulently obtained
patent to exclude competitors, 40 conspiracy with government
36 Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
31 See id. at 511-13.
31 Id. at 511.
11 Id. at 512.
40 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
1991-92]
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officials, 41 and bribery. 42 Justice Douglas observed that this list of
impermissible conduct was not exclusive or exhaustive, stating: "There
are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which
may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may
result in antitrust violations. Misrepresentations, condoned in the
political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
process." 43 Accordingly, litigation behavior is evaluated under a
different, more exacting standard than is lobbying behavior.
Finally, Justice Douglas wrote that baseless litigation can fall
within the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington:
One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go
unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge
which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and
judicial processes have been abused. That may be a difficult line
to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the case is established
that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz.,
effectively barring [competitors] from access to the agencies and
courts. Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are
involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking
refuge under the umbrella of "political expression." 44
California Motor Transport is the landmark Supreme Court
case dealing with the sham litigation exception to Noerr-Penning-
ton. Nonetheless, its vague discussion of anticompetitive intent,
"access barring," and patterns of baseless, repetitive claims, raised
many more issues than it resolved. In the two decades following
the decision, the lower federal courts have repeatedly grappled with
these issues, often reaching inconsistent results.
172, 175-77 (1965). Walker Process, a classic patent fraud case, is discussed infra at notes
99-101, 138-40 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
707 (1962) (holding that conspiracy with government official to eliminate a competitor may
result in antitrust transgression); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
1964) (holding that Sherman Act violation may be found when defendants allegedly induced
Attorney General to place financial institution into receivership). The Supreme Court has
clarified and limited the scope of the "conspiracy" doctrine. See Omni Outdoor Advertising,
-U.S. at-, 111 S. Ct. at 1350-56.
42 See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851, 862 (9th Cir.
1965) (bribery of public official may violate section 2(c) of the Clayton Act, as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act).
43 California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513. One commentator has argued that
lobbying efforts directed toward the legislative and executive branches are potentially more
harmful than sham litigation. See Minda, supra note 11, at 930-31.
" California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
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Subsequent Supreme Court rulings in the Noerr-Pennington
area have not provided many new insights into the standards for
the sham exception. In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,45
the Court was presented with a petitioning immunity argument in
connection with the filing of lawsuits by Otter Tail, allegedly to
prevent or delay establishment of competing distributors of electric
power. Because the district court had held that Noerr does not
apply to litigation (as opposed to lobbying), the Court did not
reach the issue, instead remanding it for further consideration in
light of California Motor Transport.46
The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area is the
1991 decision in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
Inc.47 Omni, an outdoor billboard firm, sued a competitor (Colum-
bia Outdoor Advertising, Inc.) and the city of Columbia, South
Carolina, claiming that the city council enacted a restrictive bill-
board ordinance that was designed to benefit Columbia Outdoor
Advertising and to limit Omni's ability to compete, with that com-
pany, which dominated the local market. 48 The major issues in the
case involved possible immunities from Sherman Act liability. With
regard to the city council's action, the state action doctrine of
Parker v. Brown49 provided immunity. As to its successful lobbying
efforts before the city council, Columbia Outdoor Advertising
claimed Noerr-Pennington immunity.50 A principal focus of Justice
Scalia's opinion was whether there was a "conspiracy" exception
to Noerr-Pennington and to its logical counterpart, state action
immunity under Parker v. Brown. Prior to Omni Outdoor Adver-
tising, several circuits had held that the state action and petitioning
immunities should not apply if the private firm and a government
4 410 U.S. 366, 368-72 (1973).
" See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1973). On remand,
the district court held that the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington squarely applied to the
case:
Upon consideration of the arguments and briefs, and upon a reconsideration
of the pertinent portions of the record, I find that the repetitive use of litigation
by Otter Tail was timed and designed principally to prevent the establishment
of municipal electric systems and thereby to preserve defendant's monopoly.
I find the litigation comes within the sham exception to the Noerr doctrine as
defed by the Supreme Court in California Transport ....
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451, 451-52 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd,
417 U.S. 901 (1974) (affirming summarily the district court's judgment).
-7 - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
" Id. at , I1l S. Ct. at 1347-48.
49 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
5 Omni Outdoor Advertising, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1348.
1991-921
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official had conspired or acted in concert, because the government
decision would thus have been tainted by improper influence.51
The Court rejected this line of reasoning, specifically holding
that there is no conspiracy exception to either the state action or
the petitioning immunities. As to the state action doctrine, Justice
Scalia observed that a conspiracy exception would be impractical:
"Since it is both inevitable and desirable that public officials often
agree to do what one or another group of private citizens urges
upon them, such an exception would virtually swallow up the
Parker rule: All anticompetitive regulation would be vulnerable to
a 'conspiracy' charge." ' 52 Noting that "Parker and Noerr generally
present two faces of the same coin,"' 53 the Court concluded that
the same considerations mandated rejection of a conspiracy excep-
tion to Noerr.
Finally, Justice Scalia elaborated on the sham exception to
Noerr:
11 See, e.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746
(8th Cir. 1982) (finding conspiracy exception to state action doctrine), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 945 (1983); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 379-81 (5th Cir. 1977) (same), vacated
sub nom. 435 U.S. 992, aff'd on reh'g, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
911 (1979). For examples of cases recognizing a possible conspiracy exception to Noerr-
Pennington immunity, see Oberndorf v. Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding evidence of conspiracy insufficient to warrant that such exception be considered);
Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 264-65
& n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding evidence insufficient to establish conspiracy but noting
some courts' adoption of conspiracy exception), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
52 Omni Outdoor Advertising, U.S. at-, I11 S. Ct. at 1351.
53 Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1355. The Court's conclusion was based on considerations
of policy and practicality:
As we have described, Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of
the principle that the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics .... The
Noerr-invalidating conspiracy alleged here is just the Parker-invading conspir-
acy viewed from the standpoint of the private-sector participants rather than
the governmental participants. The same factors which ... make it imprac-
ticable or beyond the purpose of the antitrust laws to identify and invalidate
lawmaking that has been infected by selfishly motivated agreement with private
interests likewise make it impractical or beyond that scope to identify and
invalidate lobbying that has produced selfishly motivated agreement with
public officials.... And if the invalidating "conspiracy" is limited to one
that involves some element of unlawfulness (beyond mere anticompetitive
motivation), the invalidation would have nothing to do with the policies of
the antitrust laws. In Noerr itself, where the private party "deliberately de-
ceived the public and public officials" in its successful lobbying campaign, we
said that "deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far
as the Sherman Act is concerned."
Id. at-, I11 S. Ct. at 1355-56 (citations omitted).
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The "sham" exception to Noerr encompasses situations in
which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the
outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon. A classic
example is the filing of frivolous objections to the license appli-
cations of a competitor, with no expectation of achieving denial
of the license but simply in order to impose expense and delay.
A "sham" situation involves a defendant whose activities are
"not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action"
at all, not one "who 'genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental
result, but does so through improper means.' ' ' 54
The Supreme Court's discussion of the sham exception again offers
a general rule, but little guidance for assessing claims of predatory
litigation. In particular, Justice Scalia's last statement concerning
improper means seems inapplicable to litigation, as opposed to
other forms of petitioning activity. The Court in California Motor
Transport, for example, held that misrepresentations and other
improper actions would not be condoned in the courts. 5
In summary, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides antitrust
immunity for legitimate attempts to petition the government, in-
cluding litigation before courts and administrative bodies. The
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that not all petitioning
activity is entitled to First Amendment protection and Sherman
Act immunity. When the defendant's actions constitute a sham
and are not genuine efforts to petition the government, then Noerr-
Pennington's immunity does not apply. Even if this immunity is
stripped away, it is important to note that the defendant is not yet
liable.5 6 The antitrust plaintiff must still meet the affirmative ele-
ments of its claim, which are discussed below in Part II.A.
II. SHAM LITIGATION AS A PREDATORY PRACTICE
A. Defining Predatory Behavior
Under the governing standards of section 2 of the Sherman
Act, the offense of monopolization involves two principal elements:
- Id. at - , I11 S. Ct. at 1354 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
"s See California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
56 See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (Ist Cir. 1985) (holding that
plaintiff must also prove elements of a Sherman Act violation to succeed), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1986); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690
F.2d 1240, 1247 n.7, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that if antitrust plaintiff establishes that
Noerr immunity does not apply, it must then establish elements of a Sherman Act violation),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
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"(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident. '57 If the firm
has not attained a monopoly position, it may still be liable for
attempted monopolization if the plaintiff can prove (1) a specific
intent to control prices or to destroy competition; (2) anticompe-
titive or predatory conduct designed to achieve this goal; (3) a
dangerous probability of success; and, (4) antitrust injury causally
linked to the violation.5 8 If the litigation involves concerted exclu-
sionary behavior by two or more competitors, it may violate section
1 of the Sherman Act as well.59 Finally, predatory litigation can be
an unfair trade practice, violating section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission ActA0
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish predatory, anticompeti-
tive behavior from legitimate competition on the merits. Lawrence
Sullivan describes competition on the merits as behavior designed
to "win the field by greater efficiency, better services, or lower
prices reflective of cost savings or modest profits.' '61 Predatory
behavior, on the other hand, involves "inhibit[ing] others in ways
independent of the predator's own ability to perform effectively in
the market ... calculated to impose losses on other firms, not to
garner gains for itself."62 As Sullivan notes, "Businessmen and
11 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
58 Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc., 783 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); see also Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282,
1288 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985).
19 See generally United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659-60 (1965)
(addressing claims under sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Act); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc.
v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (involving section
I claim), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Moham-
mad, 586 F.2d 530, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1978) (involving claims under sections 1 and 2), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). The FTC has brought few sham litigation cases. See
L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 14-16 (7th Cir. 1971); In re New England Motor
Rate Bureau, Inc., No. 9170, at 44-49, 1989 FTC LEXIS 62 (August 18, 1989) (filing of
tariffs with regulatory agencies).
61 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AzNRrusr 111 (1977).
Id. at 111. Robert Bork defines predatory behavior as follows:
Predation may be defined, provisionally, as a firm's deliberate aggression
against one or more rivals through the employment of business practices that
would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation either
that (1) rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the predator with a
market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be
chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds
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judges think they know it [predatory behavior] when they see it.
Economists tend to doubt that it occurs, at least very often, because
it is likely to cost the firm using it more than can be gained from
it.' '63 The Supreme Court, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp.,64 adopted a fairly helpful, albeit general, definition
of predation:
The question whether ... [a defendant's] conduct may properly
be characterized as exclusionary cannot be answered by simply
considering its effect on ... [the plaintiff]. In addition, it is'
relevant to consider its impact on consumers and whether it has
impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way. If a firm
has been "attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than
efficiency," it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory.65
There has been considerable debate in academic circles con-
cerning the extent and severity of predatory behavior. Many com-
mentators, particularly those associated with the Chicago School,
contend that exclusionary behavior rarely occurs because it would
rarely pay off.66 Others, including many adherents of the Harvard
School, believe that predation can and does occur with some fre-
quency.67
B. Economic Analysis of Predatory Behavior
A predatory or exclusionary practice is a practice designed
primarily to destroy or harm competitors, rather than to increase
sales or otherwise to succeed in the marketplace. The most common
exclusionary practice discussed in antitrust law is predatory pricing.
Traditionally, predatory pricing occurs when a firm sets its price
inconvenient or threatening.
BORuK, supra note 10, at 144.
63 SuLuivA, supra note 61, at 109 (citing GEORGE J. STIOU.R, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 113-18 (1968); L.G. Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J.L.
& EcoN. 259 (1966)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct,
61 NoTRE DAmE L. REv. 972, 972 (1986) (noting difficulty in distinguishing competitive
from exclusionary conduct by monopolists).
6 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
'5Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)
(citations omitted).
See, e.g., Bonx, supra note 10, at 144-60; RicHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 92-93, 171 (1976).
'5See generally ABA ANTITRusT SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 18, NoNPRicE PREDATION
UNDER SECTION 2 OF TH SHERMAN AcT (1991) [hereinafter ABA NoNPRicE PREDATION
MONOGRAPH]; STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981).
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below "cost,''68 in order to drive a weaker competitor or compet-
itors out of business. If the firm can successfully eliminate or at
least weaken its competitors, then it can establish a monopoly
position in the relevant market, raise prices, and recoup the losses
it suffered while implementing the predatory pricing strategy.
Many commentators, particularly those associated with the Chi-
cago School, have contended that predatory pricing is not a viable
strategy in many cases.6 9 In order for a predatory pricing strategy
to be successful, one must make three assumptions. The practice
must successfully eliminate or discipline rivals in the short run;
then the firm must be able to raise prices in the long run sufficient
to recoup its losses; and finally, the firm must be able to prevent
new competitors from entering the market while it maintains the
artificially high price levels. Unless all three of these conditions are
met, it is unlikely that predatory pricing is a profitable or rational
strategy. Thus, a predatory pricing strategy is unlikely to be at-
tempted, let alone succeed, except in a market characterized by
high barriers to entry in which a firm has "deep pockets." Entry
barriers enable the firm to prevent new entry, and deep pockets
are needed to underwrite this costly course of action.
High entry barriers are particularly important to the success of
an exclusionary practice, such as predatory pricing. Unless barriers
are high, the vanquished firm may reenter the market (or again
adopt a competitive strategy) once price levels rise. New fins,
The possible measures of "cost" include marginal cost, average variable cost, and
average total cost. The appropriate measure of a firm's cost has been the subject of much
litigation. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 233 (1st Cir.
1983) (involving price that exceeded both average total cost and incremental cost); Transa-
merica Computer Co. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1384-86 (9th
Cir.) (rejecting per se rule that price above average variable cost is conclusively presumed
legal), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior
Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Thus, a firm's pricing behavior can be considered
anti-competitive when it sells at a price below its average variable cost."), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 943 (1976).
For commentary on this issue, see Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697
(1975); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 869 (1976).
69 See Ronald H. Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4
ANTIrmUST L. & ECON. REv. 105 (1970-71); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1- J.L. & EcON. 137 (1958) (concluding that Standard Oil rarely,
if ever, engaged in predatory pricing); Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the
Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 506 (1974); Telser, supra note 63, at 259; Richard
Zerbe, The American Sugar Refinery Company 1887-1914: The Story of a Monopoly, 12
J.L. & EcON. 339 (1969).
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spotting a profit opportunity because of supracompetitive pricing
in the relevant market, might also enter the market.70 Thus, a
linchpin of a successful exclusionary practice is the presence of
high entry barriers to prevent these firms from entering the market
and competing effectively with the dominant firm.
This view of predatory pricing has largely been accepted by the
Supreme Court, as reflected in its 1986 decision Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.7' The Court noted that any
firm that engages in a price war must bear the cost of its strategy-
considerably lower prices than would otherwise prevail.72 To make
a profit, the firm must be able to maintain a monopoly in the
relevant market: "For this reason, there is a consensus among
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and
even more rarely successful." ' 73
An additional problem with predatory pricing is that the long-
term gain from such a strategy must be discounted to present
value. Using a standard cost-benefit type of analysis, the firm must
decide if the long-term gain, properly discounted, outweighs the
short-term costs, which receive little or no discounting because they
involve up-front costs. In essence, the firm is "investing" in pre-
dation, which means it will invest less in other activities, such as
research and development, advertising, new equipment, or capital
improvements to the firm's plants. 74 Before making this investment
decision, the firm must conclude that its money is better spent on
predation than on one of these alternative uses. Such a result is
by no means certain.
The common wisdom regarding the short-term "bottom line"
orientation of many large, publicly held corporations also sheds
some doubt on the view that long-term predation occurs frequently.
Whether or not it is an accurate view, 75 many believe that modern
-' Much of the credit for introducing this line of economic reasoning into legal analysis
goes to Robert Bork and Frank Easterbrook. See BoRx, supra note 10, at 144-60; Frank
H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263 (1981).
7- 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
7 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-90
(1986).
73 Id.
- The potential return from these other investments is factored into the present value
determination by selecting an appropriate discount rate. If the return from these other
investments is high, the discount rate should be higher, which means the present value
payoff from a long-term predation strategy will decrease.
7, The argument that corporations, including both corporate management and share-
holders, fail to consider long-term investments certainly seems overstated and should not
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American corporations do not look sufficiently at the big picture-
at the benefits of investing in research and development, capital
improvements, and other strategies that create long-term benefits.7 6
Yet, the predatory strategies discussed here require a long-term
view. How can it be that large corporations have a short-term bias
for corporate law purposes, but a long-term orientation for anti-
trust law purposes? One response might be that only firms that
have a monopoly or dominance in a particular market can take
the long-term view (these are the very firms that could engage in
exclusionary behavior). Although there is some plausibility to this
argument (the largest firms probably are in the best position to
take the long-term view), the common wisdom is that these same
large corporations still suffer from a short-term bias, perhaps even
in larger doses than smaller corporations. 77 Moreover, a logical
implication of the alleged short-term bias of large corporations is
that these firms have an unusually high discount rate.78 Because
the expected payoff, in present value terms, would be lower than
if a lower discount rate were used, such a firm would be less
predisposed to engage in a long-term predatory strategy.
Some commentators have argued that predatory behavior may
offer firms strategic advantages sufficient to justify the expense of
pricing below cost.79 This line of reasoning is typical of some recent
be taken as gospel. That criticism tends to ignore many situations in which the long view
was taken. It also adopts a "20/20 hindsight" mentality because firms that miscalculate are
viewed as short-sighted even if their decisions were highly defensible at the time they were
made. Finally, the unfavorable comparison often made between American corporations
versus Japanese and European (mainly German) companies ignores or underplays many
other factors that explain the success of these foreign entities, such as cultural differences,
government subsidies, successful specialization, and historical accident or good luck. This
comparison also ignores many American success stories, including the fact that Europe and
Japan are still "catching up" with America in many respects. America's failure to continue
to dominate the world economy, as it did in the 1950s and 1960s, should be viewed as an
inevitable (and probably desirable) development.
7 This view is so widespread that it really does not require any citations. But, for a
discussion, see Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. Rav. 187, 205-13 (1991)
(discussing the short-term bias in many corporate settings).
" Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, for example, focus on the high percentage
of institutional ownership among Fortune 500 corporations as a major cause of short-term
bias. See Lipton & Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 205-06.
78 See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL.
ECON. 61, 62-63 (1988).
71 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 560 (2d ed. 1980); Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. EcoN.
Ray. 335 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977-78); see also PosNER, supra note 66, at 184-87.
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thinking in the economic literature that focuses on the effect of
strategic behavior and employs dynamic, rather than static, models
of economic behavior. Under this approach, a firm would ration-
ally adopt a predatory pricing strategy in order to establish a
reputation for aggressively responding to competitors. This repu-
tation, once established and inculcated in the minds of actual and
potential competitors, should deter possible new entrants from
entering the market, as well as deter existing competitors from
breaking ranks. Moreover, a firm that has established its aggressive
reputation in one market may be able to "carry over" that repu-
tation into other markets in which it competes, thus gaining addi-
tional advantages from the predatory strategy. 0
This strategy relies on imperfect information regarding the
dominant firm's motivations and cost structure. Once again, this
type of predatory strategy also requires the firm to endure short-
term losses with the expectation of some long-term gain. Moreover,
the long-term gain from a "wild man" strategy is even more
speculative than the gain from a simpler strategy of eliminating
competitors through predation. And, the costs of engaging in such
a strategy remain high because the incumbent firm must maintain
a credible threat by accepting every challenge from potential com-
petitors.
There are probably some situations in which a firm will engage
in a short-term losing strategy in order to establish a reputation
for tough bargaining. The paradigm example of this strategy is an
insurance company that refuses to pay arguable or even meritorious
claims in order to attain a "tough" reputation. The insurer incurs
the short-term losses because it expects to recoup its expenses
through reduced policyholder claims and better settlement results.
For an exposition of this argument, see George A. Hay, A Confused Lawyer's
Guide to the Predatory Pricing Literature, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRusT ANAL-
YsTs, supra note 67, at 155, 160-61:
It can be argued that it pays a firm to absorb losses even beyond what it
could ever expect to recoup in the market at hand, if by doing so this firm
will establish a credible threat to pursue the same policy in any market in
which an entrant appears. If the threat is truly credible, it need not be exercised
beyond the first time, since future would-be entrants will elect not to challenge
the monopolist, figuring that it is a hopeless cause. To make this model work
requires only good information (i.e., the story of the predation in the first
market has to be communicated to the future would-be entrants), and some
nontrivial costs of entry and exit (so that unsuccessful entry attempts are not
costless).
There may be other prerequisites for this reputational strategy to be successful. See supra
notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
1991-92]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
A second example is a firm that has a dominant position in several
markets.8' The firm's aggressive strategy in one of those markets
may pay off in the other markets in which it competes.
The question, as a matter of antitrust policy, is whether and
in what circumstances it is desirable to condemn possible predatory
behavior. As the Supreme Court noted in Matsushita, legitimate
competition on the merits can easily be labeled exclusionary.82 A
skillful advocate can quickly transform aggressive price competition
into a prima facie case of predatory pricing. The danger, then, is
that broad condemnation of these practices might deter legitimate
competitive strategies, thus harming efficiency and consumer wel-
fare. Some commentators contend that this problem justifies a
narrow definition of predatory behavior under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, as well as various screening devices for winnowing
the truly anticompetitive practices. 83 Further, the use of a narrow
definition of predatory behavior, combined with screening devices,
reduces administrative costs because many predation claims then
can either be summarily resolved or will not be brought in the first
place.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, there has been consid-
erable debate and commentary regarding the efficacy, likelihood,
and nature of predatory pricing. James D. Hurwitz and William
E. Kovacic have summarized the far-flung debate:
No fewer than nine standards or frameworks for addressing pre-
dation have been proposed since 1975. In complexity these pro-
posals range from no standard at all-since according to these
proponents no problem exists-to a full-scale, rule of reason
analysis of all pertinent factors in each individual case. Between
these extremes, some proposals recommend adoption of short-
term or long-term marginal costs as the threshold floor for lawful
pricing. Others, in balancing the need for simplicity against the
need for a more sophisticated economic analysis, urge a prelimi-
nary evaluation of structural and other factors to determine at
the outset whether the market in question is conducive to prof-
itable predation. Some approaches examine the strategic qualities
of the predator's behavior to determine whether the conduct
would be profit-maximizing for the predator and would enhance
' See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593-94.
, See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing
Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979).
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consumer welfare in general, even if it did not have any obvious
entry-deterring or exit-inducing effects. Still other proposals, also
focusing on strategic considerations, adopt a "business as usual"
requirement, either limiting the established firm to its trend-
adjusted output for the pre-entry period or permitting only price
decreases that will not be reversed for a substantial period."
Discussion of non-price predation has not been as comprehen-
sive.85 One of the most frequently discussed types of non-price
exclusionary behavior is predatory innovation, the introduction or
redesign of a product in a manner that harms competitors, typically
by raising their costs or eliminating them as competitors. Courts
rarely uphold predatory innovation claims because the design
changes generally involve product improvements and because an-
titrust claims might chill legitimate innovation.86 Other possible
forms of non-price predation include the maintenance of excess
production capacity to deter potential entrants, 87 tying arrange-
ments, 88 brand proliferation, 9 and "excessive" advertising. 9°
" James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The
Emerging Trends, 35 VA'D. L. REv. 63, 75-77 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Although these
authors include some discussion of non-price predation, see id. at 113-39 (discussing pred-
atory innovation and promotion), the article's primary focus is on predatory pricing. For a
survey of the predatory pricing literature, see Hay, supra note 80.
15 For an excellent new survey of non-price predation, see ABA NoNPRICE PREDATION
MONOGRAPH, supra note 67.
" See, e.g., California Computer Prod. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613
F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (involving beneficial design changes); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that introduction of new
products without advance disclosure to competitors is not predatory), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980); Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 481 F.
Supp. 965, 1002-08 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that some design changes legitimate and
others not), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983). For a
summary of the literature, see ABA NONPRiCE PREDATION MONOoAPH, supra note 67, at
26-45.
See, e.g., B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory of Market Preemption:
The Persistence of Excess Capacity and Monopoly in Growing Spatial Markets, 46 EcoN-
OMNCA 149 (1979); A. Michael Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolist Pricing,
8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977).
" See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Gary
Myers, Note, Tying Arrangements and the Computer Industry, 1985 DuxE L.J. 1027.
"1 See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The
Realemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994 (1979); Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in
the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECoN. 305 (1978).
90 See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Thomas A. Wilson, The Effect of Advertising on
Competition: A Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 453 (1979). There have been relatively few cases
centering on this type of claim. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627
F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981).
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These types of non-price predation can be analyzed in a manner
similar to predatory pricing. The strategies depend on taking short-
term losses in the hopes of long-term gain. The dominant firm
may have to bear costs as high as those imposed on its competitors,
although the costs may not be as high as in the case of predatory
pricing.9' Once again, this strategy will not be cost-justified unless
the long-term payoff is large or the dominant firm can reap the
benefits of a reputation for aggressive behavior. Finally, the re-
buttal to this argument is that the dominant firm's bluff may be
called, forcing it to either expend more resources on its costly
strategy or to abandon the effort.
C. Purposes of Predatory Litigation
Abusive litigation, like any predatory practice, might serve
several anticompetitive purposes: eliminating competitors, disciplin-
ing competitors, raising rivals' costs, or creating barriers to entry.
1. Eliminating Competitors
The most extreme type of predatory practice is one designed
to drive a competitor out of business. For example, a firm might
engage in predatory pricing in order to weaken competitors that
are unable to match the firm's low prices or that cannot sustain
those low prices for an extended period of time. If a firm engaging
in predatory pricing maintains these low prices for a sufficiently
long period of time, the competitors may succumb. The weaker
firms might either leave the market entirely or might merge with a
stronger competitor (perhaps the firm that initiated the price war).
In addition to literally driving competitors out of a market, a firm
may weaken a competitor, forcing it to agree to a merger on
favorable terms. This avoids a continued price war and eliminates
the target as an independent factor in the market.
Litigation can be a much more effective method of eliminating
competitors than predatory pricing and other strategies that depend
for success on "wearing down" the target firm in the marketplace.
A general illustration of the effectiveness of litigation is Polaroid
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,92 the famous battle of the photog-
raphy titans. Polaroid's claim that Kodak infringed on its patents
9' See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.




for instant photography was successful and likely brought in a
good faith effort to enforce Polaroid's valid patents. For purposes
of this Article, the important point is the extent of Polaroid's
stunning victory: the court ordered Kodak to pay $873 million in
damages and enjoined Kodak from the instant photography mar-
ket.93 Polaroid demonstrates the power of litigation as a means of
eliminating competition and the threat with which a competitor
must deal when it is the target of litigation. Although not every
case is as meritorious as Polaroid's, many have produced similar
results for potential competitors.
The effectiveness of predatory litigation as a means of elimi-
nating competitors is illustrated by Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States,94 in which Otter Tail, an electric utility, successfully em-
ployed a pattern of litigation in order to prevent the entry of
competitors and to maintain its monopoly.95 In Federal Prescription
Service, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Association,96 a mail-
order pharmacy claimed that a pharmacy trade association and
others had conspired to eliminate the plaintiff's mail order drug
business.97 Because Federal operated its business through the mail,
it was able to offer lower prices than traditional retail druggists.
The defendants allegedly employed various tactics, including law-
suits and administrative proceedings, in an attempt to eliminate
Federal.98
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp.,99 Food Machinery obtained a patent on equipment
used in sewage treatment systems. Food machinery threatened to
enforce its patent against Walker Process, a competitor. When
Walker entered the market, Food Machinery brought suit, claiming
patent infringement. Walker counterclaimed, asserting that Food
Machinery was attempting to monopolize the market. Walker al-
leged that the patent was fraudulently obtained because Food Ma-
chinery had attested that "the invention had not been in public
11 See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1714 (D.
Mass. 1991) modifying 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass. 1990).
410 U.S. 366 (1973).
91 See id. at 368.
- 663 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
9 See id. at 256-57.
" See id. at 259-60. The court of appeals concluded that although the defendants
"engaged in a number of activities violative of the spirit of the antitrust laws," Federal's
injuries were not caused by those activities or that government intervention immunized the
actions. See id. at 272.
- 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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use in the United States for more than one year prior to filing its
patent application when, in fact, Food Machinery was a party to
prior use within such time."l 1° The Supreme Court held that Walker
had properly stated a claim for relief under section 2 of the
Sherman Act and that it could recover upon showing that the
patent was obtained by intentional fraud and by establishing the
elements of a monopolization claim. 10'
Finally, in Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Association,'°2
a group of automobile dealers allegedly sought to eliminate the
plaintiff's car-buying service. The defendant dealers claimed that
the plaintiff was competing as a new car dealer without the appro-
priate licensing, and they induced a regulatory agency to file suit
to enjoin Semke.'03
Each of these cases illustrates the potential power of litigation
as a means of eliminating competition. Many other cases have
involved allegations that litigation was used to eliminate or attempt
to eliminate competition.1 4
2. Disciplining Competitors
A second purpose for predatory behavior is to discipline com-
petitors. 0 5 Typically, a large or dominant firm, or a group of
10o Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1963).
10 See id. at 177.
-- 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972).
103 See Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (10th Cir..1972).
The court ultimately found that this activity was protected under Noerr and was not sham.
See id. at 1366-67.
"0 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972)
(involving allegations that trucking firms used litigation to eliminate competition from other
truckers); Rickards, 783 F.2d at 1332 (holding litigation was part of conspiracy to eliminate
a group of competing veterinarians); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700
F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1983) (involving allegation that AT&T sought to eliminate Litton as
a competitor in market for telephone terminal equipment through regulatory actions), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heiodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386,
387, 389 (9th Cir. 1983) (addressing claim that litigation and related adverse publicity were
used to eliminate competitor); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466,
471 (7th Cir. 1982) (involving allegation that trade secret litigation was used to eliminate
competitor), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d
986, 987-89 (9th Cir. 1979) (presenting claim that defendant brought unsuccessful patent
infringement claims to eliminate competitor in market for disposable plastic gloves), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Feminist Women's Health Ctr., 586 F.2d at 535, 542
(addressing allegation that various forms of petitioning activity by doctors, including letters
to agencies and defense of litigation, were employed to eliminate competition from an
independent abortion clinic); Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co., 428
F. Supp. 951, 952 (D. Conn. 1977) (involving claim that litigation was used to eliminate
competitor in market for burial facilities).
"I See generally DouoxLAs F. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION & PuBmuc PoaCy 343-
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firms, will seek to discipline competitors in order to facilitate
collusion. James D. Hurwitz has noted that First Amendment
protection for petitioning activity can serve as both an invitation
to collude and as a shield from antitrust scrutiny. 1°6 Firms may
well use Noerr-Pennington's immunization of collaborative peti-
tioning, including the conduct and settlement of litigation, to fa-
cilitate price fixing and normally unlawful joint action. Several
cases have included allegations that a group of existing firms used
predatory litigation while also engaged in a conspiracy to fix
prices.' °7
3. Raising Rivals' Costs
A third possible purpose of predatory behavior is to raise rivals'
costs. 108 Pennington, for example, could be viewed as a case in
which large coal producers, acting in concert with the UMW,
sought to increase the minimum wage and create other arrange-
ments that would raise the cost of doing business for smaller coal
firms. 09
The filing and conducting of a lawsuit (or the defense of a
lawsuit) impose a variety of direct and indirect costs on the target
of the litigation. Alexander v. National Farmers Organization"°
provides an illustration. The overall case involved reciprocal anti-
44 (1980) (discussing predatory pricing as a means of disciplining competitors and citing
examples from various industries).
"1 See James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Government Process, the First Amendment, and
the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEo. L.J. 65, 75 (1985).
'1 See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,
368, 376 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving litigation used to further price-fixing scheme); Clipper
Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1246, 1251 (9th
Cir. 1982) (discussing sham litigation used, as part of a price-fiing conspiracy, to prevent
price cutting by competitor), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Alexander v. National
Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1181, 1200-03 (8th Cir. 1982) (addressing allegations of price
fixing and harassment through litigation), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); Feminist
Women's Health Ctr., 586 F.2d at 535 (involving allegations of price fixing, group boycott,
and various types of petitioning activity); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482
F. Supp. 514, 517 (D. Minn. 1979) (featuring alleged use of litigation to prevent price
competition and to discipline competitor), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1042 (1981); see also Hurwitz, supra note 106, at 75-76 (citing other cases and
commentary).
"I See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclu-
sion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yam. L.J. 209 (1986); Steven
C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. Rnv. PAPEas &
PROC. 267 (1983).
119 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659-60; Salop & Scheffman, supra note 108, at 267.
11 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982).
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trust claims brought among several dairy farmer groups that were
engaged in fierce competition in the midwestern United States."'
One of the dairy groups, the National Farmers Organization
("NFO"), claimed that two dairy cooperatives had engaged in a
pattern of litigation, threatened litigation, and harassment against
NFO customers in an effort to "break NFO's back" and to make
NFO's milk "too hot to handle."" 12 Specifically, the court
recognize[d] that the litigation directly against NFO was intended
in part to hamper NFO's ability to compete. The burdensome
cost of litigation was one factor. Notes from internal [dairy
cooperative] meetings and corroborating testimony show, for ex-
ample, that senior [dairy cooperative] officials considered spon-
sorship of additional third-party litigation against NFO in the
hope that the added cost of such litigation would "break NFO's
back."" 3
Although court costs and attorneys' fees are only the starting
points, these items can, by themselves, be substantial. If even
partially and temporarily successful, a lawsuit may entail a damage
award, temporary injunctive relief that hampers the target's ability
to compete, and other remedies. A target firm may be forced to
divulge proprietary information, such as trade secrets, new product
developments, and marketing strategies in the course of discovery.
While a suit is pending, the target firm may also be forced to
disclose its contingent liability to creditors, accountants, and oth-
ers. This revelation would hamper its ability to obtain the funds
necessary to compete.1 4 The contingent liability can harm the target
firm's credit rating, raising the interest rate that the target must
pay for needed capital to compensate lenders for the increased
risks. Finally, litigation often generates adverse publicity," 5 which
M See id. at 1179.
132 1d. at 1200-01.
M Id. at 1200.
11 See, e.g., Handgards, 743 F.2d at 1296 (noting that litigation hampered plaintiff's
ability to raise capital); see also Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372 (noting that litigation hampered
bond financing). Michael W. Bien contends that the use of litigation can effectively drive
away lenders or raise the cost of financing, a feat that an individual firm could probably
not accomplish by any other means. See Michael W. Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust
Violation: Conflict Between the First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F. L. Rnv.
41, 43 n.5 (1981).
M See, e.g., Energy Conservation, 698 F.2d at 387, 389 (involving litigation that




may hamper the target's ability to deal with customers and sup-
pliers, as well as creditors.
For example, an incumbent firm may sue an entrant, alleging
violation of its trade secrets and of covenants not to compete. The
target firm will be forced to retain defense counsel and to bear the
cost of defense. The incumbent may even obtain a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction preventing the entrant
from entering the market. During discovery, the entrant may be
required to reveal its business plan, employee and customer lists,
and its method of operating. This information would be relevant
to the incumbent firm's claim that trade secrets are about to be
used or that former employees are about to commence competition
with the incumbent. Even if this information is subject to a pro-
tective order or confidentiality agreement, disclosure can harm the
entrant in several ways.1 16 Further, most upstart businesses already
face difficult challenges in obtaining financing, challenges that will
be exacerbated by the need to disclose the pending lawsuit by a
dominant firm.'17 Finally, once the litigation is over, and even
though it may be resolved in favor of the entrant, the newcomer's
entry into the market may have been delayed by weeks, months,
or even years.
Another way in which predatory litigation can raise rivals' costs
is through onerous or burdensome settlement terms. A rival may
agree to settle a case, paying lump sum damages or a stream of
payments, rather than bear the burden and expense of defending
the strike suit. For instance, the Supreme Court has noted that the
target of a weak patent infringement case may agree to pay roy-
alties to the patent holder rather than litigate."8 These royalty
payments constitute an additional cost that the target will be forced
to pay, perhaps for the duration of a seventeen-year patent. The
patent holder may even establish a track record of favorable set-
tlements with smaller rivals, which would lend further credence to
the validity of its patent claim." 9
"6 At a minimum, the incumbent firm may obtain information about its potential
competitor that it would not otherwise have discovered. The entrant may also be forced to
change some of its business methods simply to regain the element of surprise.
" See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
"' See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 338
(1971). As another court has observed, "To take a license, calling for small royalty
payments, frequently involves less expense than prolonged litigation" Kleinman v. Kobler,
230 F.2d 913, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 830 (1956).
M' The acceptance of royalty agreements by competitors, which indicates that they
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An example of a successful cost-raising strategy occurred in
CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co. °20 Several employees of Raytheon, a
large diversified electronics firm, left that firm and formed CVD.
CVD began competing with Raytheon in the manufacture of zinc-
based materials used in infrared windows and other high precision
optical devices. The employees had signed confidentiality agree-
ments, promising not to divulge Raytheon trade secrets. Raytheon
thereafter threatened litigation, claiming violation of its trade se-
crets. CVD denied that Raytheon had any protectable trade secrets
on the ground that the technology was published in government
reports and thus was in the public domain. Nonetheless, Raytheon
insisted upon and obtained a royalty agreement from CVD, under
which it would receive eight to fifteen percent royalties from the
new firm. 121 CVD then sued Raytheon, alleging an antitrust viola-
tion. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of CVD, finding that
the defendant had asserted its trade secret claim in bad faith and
used its bargaining power to force CVD into an agreement that
unlawfully restrained trade; the court of appeals affirmed.'2 CVD
presents a classic case of a dominant firm asserting weak (if not
completely baseless) claims in an effort to raise the costs of a new
entrant into the market. Again, there are many other examples.'2
4. Deterring or Delaying Entry
Finally, predatory behavior may be used to deter potential
competitors from entering a market. This strategy is most effective
have acquiesced to the enforceability of the patent claim, can then be used as evidence to
defend the validity of the patent against a later challenge. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-
Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Robert W.
Harris, The Emerging Primacy of "Secondary Considerations" as Validity Ammunition:
Has the Federal Circuit Gone Too Far?, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 185 (1989).
120 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
2I See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
22 See id. at 860.
12 See, e.g., Premier Elec. Constr. Co., 814 F.2d at 368 (addressing litigation employed
as part of scheme to raise rivals' costs); Rickards, 783 F.2d at 1335 (same); Litton Sys.,
700 F.2d at 798, 811 (involving claims that AT&T imposed costly regulatory burdens on an
entrant in the telephone terminal equipment market during a ten-year period); Clipper
Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1247, 1265 (featuring plaintiff seeking damages for costs imposed by
sham litigation); Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 640 F.2d 1107, 1108-09 (9th
Cir. 1981) (discussing 63 state court collection actions allegedly brought "as a bludgeon to
retain a monopoly and to interfere with the business relationships of a competitor"); Miracle
Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving alleged sham
litigation causing increased costs and lost profits totalling $14,200,000); Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 843 (9th Cir. 1980) (addressing litigation that allegedly
increased cost of doing business).
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in regulated markets, such as transportation and utilities. In fact,
two of the major Supreme Court decisions in this area arose from
the regulatory context: California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited,124 which concerned the long-distance trucking market,
and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,'2 which involved
electrical utilities. In both cases, the dominant incumbent firm (or
firms) allegedly employed litigation and administrative strategies
for the purpose of preventing or at least delaying the entry of new
competitors into the regulated market. The predation strategy in-
volved repeated administrative and judicial challenges, appeals from
adverse rulings, and advocacy of litigation positions regardless of
the merits. 26
Another regulatory case is Litton Systems, Inc. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.127 In that case, AT&T allegedly em-
ployed various anticompetitive means to eliminate Litton as a
competitor in the telephone terminal equipment market. AT&T's
principal weapon was its bad faith opposition to certification stan-
dards and the filing of tariff applications with the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC). AT&T was able to employ these
tactics during a ten year period, ultimately succeeding in driving
Litton from the market.12
The use of regulatory schemes to deter competition may be a
widespread phenomenon, but entry deterrence strategies are by no
means limited to traditionally regulated industries. Some elements
of regulation can be found in almost every segment of the econ-
omy. Hospitals, for example, need certificates of need from state
authorities in order to enter a market. In one case, a hospital first
sought regulatory approval in 1975, was denied approval in 1980,
obtained relief in the courts in 1982, and finally began construction
on the hospital building in 1984.129 Retail businesses need zoning
224 404 U.S. 508.
- 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
"1 See id. at 368-72; California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 509-12.
700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
' See id. at 789-90, 798, 811-12. Another regulated industry case is MCI Communi-
cations Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1096-97 (N.D. Ill.) (litigation
used to hamper financing and delay or prevent entry of competitor in telecommunications
market), aff'd on other grounds, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971
(1979).
29 See Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.2d 563, 564-65 (6th Cir.)
(involving antitrust claim based on alleged conspiracy to deny certificate of need and other
regulatory approval), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986); see generally NEIL L. CHAYET &
MICHAEL R. SoNNENREICH, CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGULATORY CONCEPT 1
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variances, building permits, and other (sometimes discretionary)
approvals from local government before they can be built. 30 Many
business and professional entrants need licenses in order to begin
competition. In each of these situations, incumbent firms may
employ administrative and judicial mechanisms in an effort to deter
or delay entry of new competitors.
Interestingly, there have been a number of sham litigation cases
involving competing shopping centers. 3' For instance, in Land-
marks Holding Corp. v. Bermant,132 the plaintiffs, who were real
estate developers, alleged that two existing shopping centers had
conspired to prevent them from opening a competing shopping
center in Hampden, Connecticut. The existing firms began a per-
sistent and eventually successful campaign to prevent the plaintiffs
from developing a competing mall. Their tactics included fourteen
(mostly baseless) lawsuits, multiple appeals from adverse decisions,
appearances at zoning hearings, litigation delaying tactics, and
massive publicity campaigns. Atypically, one of the defendants
admitted in a deposition that the existing centers would oppose the
new entrant by every means possible, with a view to either defeating
entry or at least delaying it for as many years as possible; even if
the existing firms lost, they "could delay the development of this
property a minimum of three to five years.' ' 33 Although the de-
velopers of the proposed new mall prevailed against these attacks,
the court noted that their "courtroom victories proved Pyrrhic,
for the protracted delays had by then forced them to abandon the
development.' '134 In the developers' subsequent antitrust suit, the
Second Circuit concluded, not surprisingly, that the defendants'
litigation fell within the sham exception as delineated in California
(1978) (discussing growth in health care regulation); MAnrIN THOMPSON, ANrusT AND
Ta HEA.TH CARE PROVIDER 28 (1979) (same).
130 See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text; see also Bien, supra note 114, at 43
n.6 (citing various examples of regulatory entry barriers).
"I In addition to the case discussed in the text, see Miracle Mile Assocs., 617 F.2d at
19-21 (addressing allegation by developers of proposed shopping center that the largest mall
in a Rochester suburb used baseless litigation and administrative action to delay and hinder
their development); Hahn, 615 F.2d at 833-34, 836 & n.7 (involving allegation that defen-
dants instituted nine baseless lawsuits and covertly financed four others in an attempt to
prevent development of a shopping center in downtown Santa Rosa, California in order to
retain monopoly in the market); Ross v. Bremer, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,746 (,V.D.
Wash. 1982) (featuring allegation that defendant used litigation to delay plaintiff's devel-
opment of a shopping center).
132 664 F.2d 891, 892-95 (2d Cir. 1981).
M Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891, 892 (2d Cir. 1981).
1-" Id. at 895.
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Motor Transport.135 Although the extent of the predatory litigation
in Landmarks may seem extreme, it is not unique, 136 and it dra-
matically illustrates the value of the courtroom as a sword to deter
entry into a market.
Many cases of possible entry deterrence have involved the
vigorous and sometimes unjustified enforcement of intellectual
property rights: patents, copyrights, trademarks, and various state
law theories.137 In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Ma-
chinery & Chemical Corp.,'38 the Supreme Court addressed an
antitrust counterclaim based on threats of litigation and a meritless
patent infringement suit. 39 The alleged fraud involved Food Mach-
inery's filing of a patent application despite its knowledge that the
invention had been in public use for more than one year, a fact
that bars patentability. The Court held that this entry deterrence
strategy could violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 40 In Hand-
gards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc.,'41 Ethicon, the patent holder, had a
ninety percent share of the relevant market' 42 and sought to prevent
entry of Handgards as a competitor. The jury found that Ethicon
knew that its patents were invalid on several grounds, that the
patent suit was brought in bad faith, and that Ethicon had met
the other elements of an attempted monopolization claim. The
court of appeals affirmed the verdict and the award of $3.6 million
I's See id. at 895-98.
136 See also supra note 131.
3 For examples of cases besides those discussed in the text, see CVD, 769 F.2d at
847 (involving bad faith assertion of trade secret violation); Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 468
(involving actual and threatened patent suits); Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673
F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 1982) (addressing existing firm that brought trade secret claim
and threatened a patent claim in an attempt to deter new competitor); Handgards, 601 F.2d
at 987-89 (involving defendant that brought unsuccessful patent infringement claims); Kobe,
Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 418 (10th Cir.) (addressing patent and unfair
competition claims), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). See also Business Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Communications Enters., - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 922, 925-26 (1991) (Rule
11 case in which incumbent firm brought copyright claim without reasonable investigation);
cf. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (affirming finding
that patent suit was not brought in bad faith); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home,
Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding copyright claim brought in good faith);
Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no evidence that
trade secret action was a sham given that it was still pending at time of district court's
decision).
'38 382 U.S. 172.
23 See id. at 173-75.
140 See id. at 174.
-" 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985).
1,2 The market was that for heat-sealed plastic gloves.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
in damages, $1.1 million in attorneys' fees, and $3 million in post-
judgment interest. 43
Litigation can have a particularly detrimental effect on the
ability of a new firm to obtain financing. Generally, lenders will
be reluctant to provide funds to a venture that is the target of a
lawsuit brought by a powerful competitor. In Otter Tail, for ex-
ample, the target utility firms were unable to sell bonds necessary
for financing their operations while the anticompetitive lawsuits
were pending. Before the bonds could be issued and sold, the new
entrants needed to obtain legal opinions assuring investors that no
pending or threatened litigation would impair the legality or value
of the bonds.' 44 Otter Tail's litigation strategy thus completely
thwarted the financing effort and prevented entry until the litiga-
tion ended.
Financing also played a role in CVD, where a new entrant
agreed to sign a royalty agreement with Raytheon. The entrant
believed that it would not be able to obtain the necessary financing
if it were sued by Raytheon for violation of trade secrets.' 4- Finally,
in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding,'46 a shopping center case, the
existing competitor allegedly knew that the thirteen lawsuits it filed
or secretly sponsored would prevent the marketing of bonds nec-
essary to finance a new shopping center development.' 47 As these
cases demonstrate, a competitor's entry into a market can effec-
tively be delayed or even prevented altogether through use of the
litigation process.
D. Economic Analysis of Predatory Litigation
The concerns that led the Supreme Court to be skeptical of
predatory pricing claims in Matsushita do not apply as persuasively
to claims of anticompetitive litigation. In many respects, abusive
litigation is very different from predatory pricing.
Predatory litigation does not have a direct effect on price levels,
although it may raise costs in an industry. Rather, it is a strategy
'41 See Handgards, 743 F.2d at 1285-300.
I" See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372. Another case involving the target's inability to
obtain bond financing is Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 486
(8th Cir. 1985) (involving litigation that allegedly prevented issuance of bonds and ultimately
caused target firm to go into bankruptcy), later proceeding, 817 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1987).
See CVD, 769 F.2d at 855.
615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980).
4 See id. at 840-41.
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that is designed to achieve other exclusionary results in the mar-
ketplace. In this manner, it resembles other forms of non-price
predation, such as predatory innovation.
Litigation may be a more effective means of predation than
other tactics, such as predatory pricing and innovation. Michael
W. Bien points out, for example, that litigation may not be as
costly for the dominant firm as predatory pricing. 148 If the new
entrant's cost structure is relatively similar to that of the dominant
firm, predatory pricing requires the dominant firm to incur sub-
stantial losses in deterring entry. Moreover, because the dominant
firm has a larger share of the market than its target, the larger
firm will be forced to bear the cost of its predatorily low prices
over a higher volume of sales than that of the target. 149 Accord-
ingly, the dominant firm's losses from predatory pricing will nor-
mally exceed the target's losses.
Predatory litigation, on the other hand, should not cost the
predator more than it does the target. In fact, litigation may allow
the dominant firm to impose asymmetrical costs on the entrant
through the effective use of burdensome discovery requests.' 50 As
James D. Hurwitz has noted, "Legal claims are often far easier to
make than to refute, especially when the requirements for obtaining
summary disposition are demanding and strict." ' -" He observes
that this asymmetry is particularly severe in regulated industries
where the target must demonstrate a "need" for its product or
service. Because a target, with everything to lose from an adverse
decision, will feel the need to spend heavily on its defense, the
incumbent's cost of objecting to the target will be lower than the
target's cost of responding to those objections. 52
The litigation process itself may be weighted in favor of the
initiating party. The predator is almost always the "plaintiff"; the
target is normally a "defendant.' ' 53 Under normal rules of pro-
,,8 See Bien, supra note 114, at 42 n.2.
,4 Id.
110 Id. According to Bien, the dominant firm can use depositions, document requests,
interrogatories, and requests for admissions to force the small entrant to expend attorneys'
fees and managerial time. See also Hurwitz, supra note 106, at 70-73 (discussing cost
asymmetries created by litigation and other petitioning activity).
,' Hurwitz, supra note 106, at 71.
,, Id. For example, AT&T imposed considerable costs on Litton, a potential compet-
itor in the market for telephone terminal equipment, through its alleged abuse of the
regulatory process. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
"I There have been few cases in which the defense of lawsuits has been viewed as
sham. See In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
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cedure, the plaintiff selects the forum, the preliminary issues to be
resolved, and often the initial direction of discovery. The defendant
must respond and frame a defense based on all available grounds.
If the defendant believes the claim is baseless, it bears a heavy
burden in seeking summary disposition. Given modem rules of
notice pleading and liberal discovery,' 14 lawsuits do not go away
overnight. A motion to dismiss will not be granted unless, as a
matter of law, the complaint fails "to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." ' 155 Courts assume the truth of all factual
allegations in the complaint, drawing all inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. If any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint states a claim for relief, courts will not grant the motion
to dismiss. 156
Similarly, the defendant will not be able to obtain summary
judgment unless it can show "that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.' 57 Although the Supreme Court relaxed
the standards for federal court summary judgment in a 1986 trilogy
of cases, 58 the plaintiff can still defeat the motion by demonstrating
that material issues of fact exist, a showing that the plaintiff can
easily make in many cases. 59 Thus, by virtue of the laudable desire
firm's actions in defending litigation can fall within the sham exception if the defense was
"not significantly motivated by an honest and reasonable desire to influence the court's
decision"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988); cf. Feminist Women's Health Ctr., 586 F.2d
at 543 (holding that, in instant circumstances, defense of antitrust action cannot be basis
for finding of sham litigation); MCI Communications Corp., 462 F. Supp. at 1097 (same).
11' See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that complaint shall contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(f) (allowing party to obtain discovery prior to grant of summary judgment).
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
256 See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
117. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c). The court will not make credibility determinations, see Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.l1 (1983), which means the
plaintiff can often force relatively weak cases to trial simply by obtaining testimony contra-
dicting the defendant on a material issue.
15s See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574.
119 The court in Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec-
utive Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940
(1977), discussed this problem in the context of antitrust litigation, but its point is applicable
here as well:
[I]t takes little to establish a conflict of evidence as to a material fact. And if
the defendants, by affidavits . . ., show that the case is without merit, and if
fear of perjury (a rather uncommon fear among the makers of affidavits)
prevents the filing of directly conflicting affidavits, Rule 56 still gives the
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to allow plaintiffs to have their day in court, procedural rules may
enable an incumbent firm to ensnare a competitor in protracted
and costly litigation, with the effect of delaying or deterring entry,
imposing costs on the target, or even completely eliminating the
competitor.
It would seem that a predatory litigation strategy would be
particularly effective if the dominant firm faces repeated chal-
lenges, because many of the litigation documents could be reused.
This "economy of scale"''6 does not appear in the case of other
predatory strategies, such as predatory pricing and predatory in-
novation. Those practices require a new devotion of resources every
time a dominant firm confronts a conipetitor-a renewed "price
war" or other costly course of action.
These factors indicate that predatory litigation may cost some-
what less than other anticompetitive strategies. At the same time,
the benefits of abusive litigation may be as great or greater than
those of other techniques. As has been demonstrated, predatory
litigation can effectively accomplish several anticompetitive objec-
tives, from raising rivals' costs, to disciplining competitors, to
delaying or deterring entry, to completely eliminating a competi-
tor. 161
A central argument adopted by the Supreme Court in Mat-
sushita is that predatory pricing is rare because few firms can
reasonably expect to maintain and exercise monopoly power. 162 As
soon as prices go up, the argument goes, new competitors are
drawn into the market by the profit opportunity. Yet, predatory
litigation may be more effective in deterring competition. A new
potential competitor may fear that the dominant firm will use the
same litigation tactics that were employed against the first target
firm, especially because the incumbent's costs of doing so may
drop because its litigation documents are already prepared. 163
plaintiffs an escape hatch. They can claim they won't know the facts until
they have had discovery and get action on the motion postponed.
Id. at 1083.
160 See Hurwitz, supra note 106, at 71 (noting that a predator "may be able to reduce
its average litigation costs by modifying and reusing prior filings").
263 See supra part II.C.
-a See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589.
,6 The new entrant may reduce its cost of defense by seeking a law firm with expertise
in the field (and hence with its own bank of litigation documents). The problem with this
approach is that attorneys with such expertise, developed through representation of other
clients, might charge a premium or might have higher billing rates that reflect the attorneys'
developed expertise and reputation. Thus, the benefits of retaining experienced counsel may
be counterbalanced by their increased cost.
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A predatory strategy that depends on establishing a "tough"
reputation is subject to several criticisms. Most importantly, the
bluff must be successful in deterring later entrants. An aggressive
potential entrant may be willing to call the bluff, at which point
the original firm must either continue the predatory practices and
take further losses or else abandon the strategy. Abandoning the
strategy as to one entrant in the market would signal to all others
that the path is now clear for entry. Therefore, because a second
or subsequent lawsuit may be less costly than the first suit, a threat
of predatory litigation may be more credible than threat of other
actions.
Bien also notes that the dominant firm can divert potential
customers away from the entrant by threatening to add them to
the lawsuit. 164 This threat is credible, for example, in a trade secret
suit in which the dominant firm can claim that the customers
purchased and used products with full knowledge that they were
produced by improperly usurping the dominant firm's trade secrets.
Other methods of drawing away customers, such as price reduc-
tions, are likely to be costlier than the threat of litigation, partic-
ularly if the predatory lawsuit is already pending against other
defendants.
Further, predatory litigation may be more difficult to detect
and penalize than a predatory pricing strategy or other means of
direct interference in the marketplace. Most enforcement activity,
by both private plaintiffs and the government, is focused in other
areas. Among predation strategies, predatory pricing and certain
forms of non-price predation receive more attention.' 65 Litigation
is, of course, a protected First Amendment petitioning activity,
and it can also further whatever interests are served by the under-
lying litigation, at least if the lawsuit has some merit. Thus, re-
sorting to litigation does not readily conjure up accusations of
predation. Given the uncertain legal standards governing sham
litigation and the complexity of analysis necessary to evaluate
particular fact situations, a firm that believes it is the target of
exclusionary behavior through the courtroom may choose not to
bring an antitrust claim, particularly if the claim will involve sat-
'" See Bien, supra note 114, at 42 n.2.
10 See Salop & White, supra note 1, at 1006-08 (analyzing private antitrust litigation
and finding that less than one percent of these cases involves unlawful inducement of
government action); see also supra note 60 (noting the small number of reported decisions
involving FTC allegations of sham litigation).
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ellite litigation, further draining the target firm's assets and ener-
gies. The target firm may also be deterred from seeking redress
under the Sherman Act by the high hurdles that must be sur-
mounted, including proof that the sham exception applies and
proof of the underlying Sherman Act violation.
Finally, some of the dangers of overly aggressive antitrust
enforcement in the pricing and product innovation areas-do not
apply in the litigation arena. The Supreme Court, as well as lower
courts and commentators, has expressed concern that legitimate
price competition would be chilled if courts too readily found a
particular price cut to be predatory. 166 Similarly, courts have been
wary of condemning product changes as exclusionary, fearing that
such a rule would deter desirable research and development. 67
These arguments reflect the more general fear, which the Supreme
Court expressed in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 68 that
the antitrust laws may inadvertently deter procompetitive behavior,
such as certain vertical agreements, aggressive price cutting, or
product innovation. 169
Litigation can serve a variety of beneficial purposes, such as
furthering the policies underlying a party's claim and allowing the
exercise of First Amendment rights, but it also presents a good
opportunity for abuse. Although distinguishing predatory conduct
from legitimate competition is difficult when applied to most types
of business conduct, courts and judges are probably best equipped
to make this determination in the area of sham litigation. The
business of the courts, after all, is litigation. Every good judge is
a good lawyer and should be able to spot abusive litigation. Thus,
if we trust the judiciary (and lay jurors) to decide whether a
particular pricing strategy is predatorily below some measure of
cost or whether the introduction of a new product is anticompeti-
tive, we should more readily trust them to determine whether a
lawsuit has been instituted or conducted as a form of predation.
In short, the economic rationales for skepticism against pred-
atory pricing claims, which the Supreme Court adopted in Mat-
26 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594-95 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984)); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 234 ("[W]e must be concerned lest
a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing
behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition."). See generally BoRx, supra
note 10, at 155 (arguing that antitrust enforcement can "dampen the vigor of price com-
petition").
167 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
1-8 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
119 See id. at 762-64.
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sushita, are not as persuasive in the case of predatory litigation. A
litigation-based strategy costs less, is potentially more effective,
and is less likely to be detected than a strategy based on pricing
competitors out of business. Further, the danger of chilling pro-
competitive behavior does not appear as severe when courts address
predatory litigation.
E. Predatory Litigation: Economic Models
A simple economic model can be used to illustrate a firm's
decision to implement litigation. In a garden variety lawsuit, a
plaintiff will bring a claim only if the expected benefits of the
lawsuit exceed the costs. The expected benefits of the suit would
typically be the anticipated value of the money judgment and
injunctive relief, "J," discounted by the probability of winning
the case, "x." The expected costs are the plaintiff's costs of
engaging in litigation, "C," including attorneys' fees, court costs,
expert witness fees, time spent by employees on the litigation,
travel, and other miscellaneous expenses. The risk-neutral plaintiff
will consider filing suit only if
xJ>C.
If this condition is not met, the lawsuit will lead to a net expected
loss. For example, if the plaintiff has a sixty percent chance of
prevailing and obtaining a $1,000,000 judgment, while expending
$120,000 in litigation costs, the expected benefits of the lawsuit
($600,000) exceed the costs ($120,000). On the other hand, ceteris
paribus, if the plaintiff has only a ten percent chance of victory,
the rational and risk-neutral plaintiff will not bring suit because
the expected recovery, $100,000, is less than the $120,000 that
would be spent on the case. 70
Even if the above condition is satisfied, a plaintiff may not
bring the suit because of risk aversion. A risk averse plaintiff, one
that prefers a bird in the hand over two in the bush, would be
unlikely to invest in a lawsuit with a high risk of failure, even
though the expected return is positive.17 1
170 Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 472-73, discusses the
relevance of cost-benefit analysis to predatory litigation claims.
,71 A risk-neutral person is concerned only with the expected payoff amounts. Risk-
averse persons, on the other hand, will consider the variation between outcomes because
they wish to avoid large losses. In order to analyze the behavior of a risk averse person, it
is necessary to translate the dollar payoffs into utility ("U"), where U is determined by
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The predation value of a lawsuit changes these equations dra-
matically. If an additional benefit arising from the litigation is that
the plaintiff obtains some type of market advantage (or places the
new market entrant at a disadvantage), then the suit will have
collateral benefits not directly related to the recovery of a money
judgment. These expected benefits, discounted to present value,
must be added to the balance. The following equation includes a
variable, "L," that reflects the anticipated marketplace profit from
the litigation:
xJ+L>C.
The addition of a marketplace profit factor means that some
lawsuits that would not otherwise have been economically justifi-
able may be pursued because they will produce monopolistic gains
in the marketplace. The example above that involved a ten percent
chance of recovery provides an illustration. According to the model,
the lawsuit would not be brought because the expected net return
from the money judgment is negative. Yet, if the filing and pros-
ecution of that lawsuit would produce a stream of additional
monopoly profits (or increased prices) equal to $100,000 in present
value, the litigation would become attractive to the rational, profit-
maximizing firm: (.10 x $1,000,000) + $100,000 - $120,000 =
$80,000. The expected rate of return would be ($100,000 + $100,000
- $120,000) / $120,000 = 67%. Suddenly, a meritless lawsuit
becomes a profit opportunity that a firm would be reluctant to
miss.
From an economic viewpoint, of course, the lawsuit should not
be brought. The gains from monopolistic or increased prices are
not socially desirable, given that they lead to the same deadweight
losses and wealth transfers from consumers that any monopolistic
behavior causes. 172 Moreover, the litigation costs expended by the
both the payoff and the riskiness of the activity, i.e., U = f (Payoff, Risk). Risk-preferring
persons, on the other hand, actually prefer to take risks in the hope of obtaining a higher
payoff.
The assumption of risk neutrality in this model is a reasonable one, given that the
relevant parties are corporate entities that are likely to have substantial assets, allowing
them to absorb the costs of engaging in a predatory litigation strategy. Of course, the higher
the stakes, the less reasonable it is to assume risk neutrality.
17 There have been many studies demonstrating that monopoly creates deadweight
losses, including not only the distortion caused by supracompetitive pricing but also the
monopolist's expenditure of resources to maintain its market position. See, e.g., HERBERT
Hovmp.as, EcoNoIcs AND FEmAL ANTrrRusr LAw 19-24 (1985); FRannmuc M. Sceamsa,
INDusTRIL MAR=r SmucTr AND EcONOMC PERFoRmANCE 459-71 (2d ed. 1980); Richard
A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 807 (1975).
Of course, monopoly pricing also results in higher prices for consumers.
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plaintiff and the defendant would not be incurred but for the
prospect of ill-gotten gains. These expenditures are made solely
because the dominant firm seeks to maintain its monopoly position,
a socially undesirable use of scarce resources.
This economic model suggests several conclusions relevant to
claims of predatory litigation. First, it is important to distinguish
cases in which a lawsuit is cost-justified from those in which a
lawsuit is not. If the lawsuit is cost-justified in terms of the
expected recovery (in present value terms), discounted by the like-
lihood of success and reduced by the cost of bringing the suit,
then the litigation is presumptively efficient and should not be
deterred. The litigation is in fact efficient if the underlying legal
claim involves a wealth-maximizing legal rule. For purposes of this
model, one must assume that the underlying legal rule is efficient,
and there is no reason to dispute that assumption. 173 Further, the
First Amendment's right to petition mandates that a lawsuit with
a reasonable prospect of success not be penalized, unless it is
brought in bad faith or pursued for an improper motive.
If the expected payoff from the litigation is negative, the firm
is likely to have engaged in predation. The antitrust plaintiff can
confirm this suspicion by showing that the defendant obtained
some marketplace benefit from the litigation, typically through the
maintenance and exercise of a monopoly or of market power. The
defendant presumably was able to raise prices, increase profits,
and reduce output in the relevant market. The defendant engaged
in predatory litigation for its anticompetitive effect in the market,
not for the anticipated courtroom recovery. Thus, this economic
model suggests that litigation that would not have been brought
absent collateral market effects is inefficient and should be deterred
by the antitrust laws. The antitrust laws can deter and prevent this
presumptively inefficient litigation by creating appropriate enforce-
ment mechanisms, primarily treble-damage private antitrust claims.
A more sophisticated model of a firm's decision to engage in
predatory litigation can now be introduced. It includes the threat
of an antitrust claim by the target firm. This last model is an
'7 For example, if a patent infringement lawsuit is likely to generate a net positive
recovery, i.e., if xJ - C > 0, this model assumes that the lawsuit is efficient. The validity
of this assumption depends on the efficiency of patent law rules and the ability of the legal
system to resolve disputes correctly. Whether the many possible theories of recovery that a




application and modification of the general model developed by
economists Steven C. Salop and Lawrence J. White. 7 4 The model
introduces several additional variables:
s = Probability of antitrust claim (as perceived by predator);
p = Probability that target would prevail in the antitrust case
(as perceived by predator);
B = Benefits from predation until final judgment in the anti-
trust case;
Cp = Cost of target's antitrust claim;
Cd = Cost of predator's defense of antitrust claim;
m = Damages multiplier for successful antitrust claims; and
D = Provable antitrust damages suffered by target firm.
Applying a variation of the Salop and White model, the predator
firm will commit the violation if:
(1-s)(xJ+L) + s(1-p)(xJ+L) + s(p)(B) _ C + sCd +
s(p)(mD + Cp). 75
To explain this equation more fully, the first term,
(l-s)(xJ + L), represents the expected gains from undetected pred-
atory litigation, discounted by the probability that the target firm
will not sue. The second term, s(l-p)(xJ + L), represents the same
expected gain, discounted by the probability that the plaintiff will
bring, but lose, an antitrust claim. The third term, s(p)(B), accounts
for whatever gain occurs if the target brings a successful antitrust
claim.176
On the other side of the equation, the first term, C, represents
the cost of the anticompetitive strategy, which the predator will
incur in every case (thus, it is not discounted). The second term,
sCd, represents the predator's cost of defending an unsuccessful
antitrust claim, which is discounted by the probability that the
target will bring suit. The last term, s(p)(mD + Cp), is the predator's
loss if the target brings a successful antitrust claim. 77
Using the modified Salop and White model, the prospect of
treble damages increases the expected cost of a predatory strategy,
174 See Salop & White, supra note 1, at 1053-54.






as would the availability of attorneys' fees for the successful anti-
trust plaintiff. As Salop and White note, moreover, these remedies
are likely to increase "s," the probability that the target will bring
an antitrust claim in the first place. 178 An increase in that variable
reduces the expected benefits and substantially increases the ex-
pected costs of an exclusionary strategy, making it less likely to
occur. Thus, if predatory litigation is to be deterred effectively,
antitrust law standards must identify situations in which the prac-
tice occurs and permit the antitrust plaintiff to prove it.
F. Prevalence of Predatory Litigation
There is some disagreement about the degree to which preda-
tory litigation is a problem. Robert Bork views sham litigation as
a serious threat to free competition:
There is, of course, no way of estimating precisely how much
competition is crippled or stifled each year through the abuse of
governmental processes. However, the number of cases beginning
to arise in this relatively new field of litigation (as well as some
practical experience with local businessmen) leads one to believe
that this form of predation may be common and that the aggre-
gate annual loss to consumers may be very large. The antitrust
laws can make a major contribution both to free competition and
to the integrity of administrative and judicial processes by catch-
ing up with this means of monopolization. 79
Others contend that predatory litigation rarely occurs.
180
One way to measure the increase in the volume of antitrust
cases alleging anticompetitive sham litigation is to determine the
number of cases decided over the last two decades in which such
a claim was raised. The figures in the table below are the results
of searches conducted on the LEXIS computerized data base,
requesting all reported federal antitrust cases involving sham
litigation and citing California Motor Transport. This raw com-
pilation of cases has then been manually verified and supple-
mented.
See id. at 1054 (noting that "s" is affected by several other variables in their
model).
'79 BoRx, supra note 10, at 348-49.
-o See Christopher C. Klein, Predation in the Courts: Legal versus Economic Analysis
in Sham Litigation Cases, 10 INT'L RE v. L. & ECON. 29, 29 & n.3 (1990) (citing commentary).
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TABLE 1: REPORTED CASES INVOLVING CLAIMS OF
PREDATORY LITIGATION
Time Supreme Court of District Total
Period Court Appeals Court
1971-75 3 1 4 8
1976-80 1 11 28 40
1981-85 1 32 27 60
1986-90 0 16 19 35
This information reveals that there have been approximately 145
reported opinions concerning sham litigation during the last twenty
years.' 8' In addition to this substantial body of cases, numerous
cases involving sham litigation have undoubtedly been brought and
resolved without a published opinion. 8 2 Thus, the actual number
of predatory litigation cases brought in the last twenty years is
likely to be much higher. There is no indication that litigation in
this area is declining, although slightly fewer reported decisions
may ultimately be published in the most recent five year period.
This decline may be the result of decisions by the courts of appeals
establishing "the law of the circuit," resulting in an increased rate
of settlement.
" As mentioned, the information in the table is based on research conducted using
the LEXIS computerized data base and searching for opinions that refer to "sham litigation"
and California Motor Transport. Searches for cases decided before California Motor Trans-
port, a 1972 decision, substituted citations to Noerr. This research was conducted on
November 7, 1991.
2 Christopher C. Klein has conducted a helpful analysis of cases involving sham
litigation claims. His study notes that there were approximately 200 claims of sham litigation
filed prior to 1984, and that 196 cases were brought between January 1982 and September
1985. See Klein, supra note 180, at 30 n.5. Klein found the following allegations concerning
the purpose of predatory litigation: imposing litigation costs - 63.5%; preventing expansion
- 25.2%; delaying expansion - 16.5%; preventing entry ("target enjoined") - 14.7%; raising
business costs - 12.2%; causing lost sales - 12.2%; eliminating a competitor - 7.0%. See id.
at 35. Klein acknowledges that his sample of cases might suffer from problems of selection
bias-the reported cases may not be representative of all cases filed because some types of
cases (close cases) may be more likely to reach a reported decision. See id. at 34. Still,
Klein notes that this problem may not be too severe because strategic behavior by litigants
can lengthen the proceedings, even in cases that are not close or where the parties expec-
tations about the outcome are similar. See id. Klein concludes his paper with a statistical
analysis supporting his hypothesis that successful cases (i.e., cases surviving a motion to
dismiss) alleging sham litigation tend to have indicia of predatory behavior, as defined by
economic theory. See id. at 39-40.
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III. SHAM LITIGATION STANDARDS: APPLYING THE MODEL
A. Selecting a Standard for Sham Litigation
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has provided only
general guidelines for application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
and its sham exception.183 The task of applying these general stan-
dards in specific cases has thus been left to the lower courts.
As Christopher C. Klein has observed: "The case law fre-
quently defines sham litigation as anticompetitive litigation that is
either 'baseless' or fraudulent, whereas economic analysis empha-
sizes the anticompetitive goals that motivate the use of government
processes to attack rivals.' '  One of the theses of this Article is
that cost-benefit analysis can help provide definition to the sham
exception, offering guidance to courts and parties in resolving
whether a firm's litigation activities can be viewed as sham or as
legitimate petitioning. Some courts have adopted legal standards
that incorporate this cost-benefit test, or tests that lead to similar
results. Other courts, however, have taken a very narrow approach
to finding cases of "sham." These courts have failed to give
sufficient consideration to the danger predatory litigation poses to
competition and to the potential for abuse of courtroom processes.
Courts agree with the general notion that whether litigation is
genuine or sham is a question of fact.15 Generally, courts have
also held that the antitrust plaintiff has the burden of establishing
that the litigation is unprotected sham; in other words, litigation
is presumed to be a genuine petitioning activity unless the antitrust
plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to the contrary.8 6 Courts dif-
fer considerably, however, in defining what constitutes "sham"
litigation.
See supra part I.
"4 Klein, supra note 180, at 29.
185 See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1983); Coastal
States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1371 (5th Cir. 1983); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky
Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 674 F.2d 1240, 1252, 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
-86 E.g., Aydin, 718 F.2d at 903; MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1155 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). In the Fifth Circuit,
the defendant has the initial burden of production, requiring it to demonstrate that it is
entitled to immunity; the plaintiff then has the burden of establishing that the defendant's
conduct falls within the sham exception. See Coastal States Mktg., 694 F.2d at 1372 n.46;
cf. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1566 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (approving jury instructions placing burden on antitrust defendant to establish
that petitioning was genuine), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986).
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At one extreme is Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., ' 7 a
Tenth Circuit decision. Hydro-Tech's antitrust claim was based on
Sundstrand's prior institution of an unsuccessful trade secret claim
against it, which Hydro-Tech alleged was lacking in probable cause
and was brought for the purpose of interfering with its business
and maintaining Sundstrand's monopoly.'88 The Tenth Circuit held
that "sham litigation" involves a gross abuse of process, requiring
more than the filing of a baseless lawsuit with anticompetitive
intent.1 9 Although acknowledging that its list was not exclusive,
the court stated that the antitrust plaintiff must show "a pattern
of baseless actions ... [or] bribery, perjury, denial of access to
the courts, or the like, as those several matters are referred to in
California Motor Transport.",9o
Other courts have also required the target firm to overcome
high hurdles to establish that the sham exception is applicable.
Some of these courts have required the target to show a pattern
of repetitive claims, indicating that a single lawsuit is not sufficient
to support a finding of sham. 191 Others have focused on the need
to show improper activity, like bribery or perjury, such as the
Ninth Circuit's brief opinion in Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph Co.'92 According to the court:
Although baseless, repetitive and sham claims may be an abuse,
multiplicity, by itself, does not vitiate Noerr-Pennington protec-
tions.... No case can be found which finds multiple claims
brought with the purpose of interfering with others' business
relationships to be unprotected by Noerr-Pennington. In each
case of "sham," an improper interference with administrative or
judicial process is found. 93
673 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1982).
' See Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (10th Cir.
1982).
19 See id. at 1176 & n.6.
11 Id. at 1175 (citing California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972)). Although not as extreme, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Handgards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980), has a similar
effect. There the court held that "the commencement and maintenance of related infringe-
ment actions in what the jury found to be bad faith" did not violate the Sherman Act
because the jury should have been instructed that litigation is presumed to be brought in
good faith and that such presumption can be overcome only if the antitrust plaintiff can
establish clear and convincing evidence of bad faith. See id. at 995-96.
" See infra notes 233-53 and accompanying text.
" 640 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1981).
Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 640 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1981). The
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Finally, some courts, again drawing from Justice Douglas's
language in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited,1 94 have insisted on a showing that the predator's actions
constituted "access barring," depriving the target of meaningful
access to a tribunal or agency. 195 This formulation is particularly
troubling because the concept of access barring, which was mean-
ingful in the regulatory context in which it arose in California
Motor Transport, does not make sense when applied to litigation.
In a regulated industry, a dominant firm can prevent its target
from getting access to operating licenses and other regulatory ap-
provals that are necessary to obtain access to the relevant market.
In litigation, however, the predatory firm generally does not seek
to prevent its target from gaining access to the courts or to judicial
relief; rather, the predatory firm seeks to misuse the legal process
to inflict collateral harm on the target. In a sense, the predatory
court's startling statement may be partially explained by the unusual facts of the case, which
involved the filing of 63 collection actions. See id. at 1108. Although repetitiveness would
normally be a strong indicator of predatory litigation, Ad Visor may be distinguishable
because the filing of numerous collection actions is a normal and justifiable business practice.
Still, other courts have focused on the need for a showing of ethical misconduct. See, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. 514, 521 (D. Minn. 1979) ("T]he
institution of a single lawsuit without any allegations that the lawsuit involves ethical
misconduct similar to the abuses described in California Motor Transport is not sufficient
to bring the defendants' actions within the 'sham exception' to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine."), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981);
Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951, 954-56 (D.
Conn. 1977) (discussing need for showing of "corrupt" practices).
194 See 404 U.S. at 512.
191 See, e.g., Hufsmith v. Weaver, 817 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring access
barring or improper acts); Affiliated Capital Corp., 735 F.2d at 1567-68 (holding that sham
exception involves denial of meaningful access to a government entity) (dictum); Miracle
Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980) (.'[A]ccess-barring is the
cornerstone to the sham exception."') (quoting Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate Inc.,
454 F. Supp. 1124, 1134-35 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978)); First Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. at 520-21 (requiring either
access barring or ethical misconduct); see also Handgards, 601 F.2d at 998 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Franchise Realty might be interpreted to require ... that the defendant's
conduct was designed to cause competitive injury by exacting such extraordinary costs that
meaningful use of an agency or tribunal was barred ..... "); Franchise Realty Interstate
Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076,
1080-81 (9th Cir. 1976) (implying that plaintiff must show access barring), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 940 (1977).
Commentators have been critical of these decisions. See Hurwitz, supra note 106, at
101-02 & n.163 (citing commentators); see also Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and
the Antitrust Laws, 29 Busr'. L. Rav. 39, 47-48 (1980) (arguing persuasively that later




firm may want the target to get its "day in court"-in fact as
many days in court as possible, so that the target will incur addi-
tional costs, will be hampered in its ability to raise capital and to
compete, and will perhaps be driven from the market entirely.
Each of these judicial formulations of the sham exception
appears to be too strict, at least in the context of predatory
litigation. The economic analysis developed in this Article suggests
that a litigation strategy that is not cost-justified except by virtue
of its anticompetitive effect should fall within the sham exception.
In other words, if the predator would not have sued "but for"
the exclusionary benefits of the suit, then that firm's actions should
not be immune from antitrust scrutiny.
Most often, this cost-benefit test would lead to the same result
as a standard requiring that the litigation be "baseless," "abu-
sive," "frivolous," or "lacking in probable cause," all formula-
tions that courts have adopted. 196 As the economic model developed
in Part II illustrates, 197 the expected recovery from litigation must
be discounted for the risk of failure. If the claim is very weak or
completely frivolous, any expected recovery must be heavily dis-
counted, making it unlikely that a baseless lawsuit would ever be
cost-justified, particularly given that litigation is never inexpensive.
For example, if a legal claim has only a ten percent chance of
success and if litigation costs amount to $100,000, a risk-neutral
plaintiff would not bring the claim unless it realistically expected
to obtain at least $1,000,000 if it prevailed at trial. As the proba-
bility of success falls, say to five percent, the expected judgment
must be $2,000,000. In this manner, the legal concept of "base-
lessness" and the economic cost-benefit standard dovetail. Depend-
ing on the particular factual setting and the sophistication of the
audience, one or the other characterization may be more useful.
Moreover, there is no bright line beyond which a claim fails to
"I See In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
claim must have reasonable basis and be brought in goodfaith to be immune), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1007 (1988); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 811 (2d
Cir. 1983) (adopting baseless or abuse of process standard), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 470-73 (7th Cir. 1982)
(adopting lack of probable cause or improper purpose standard), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958
(1983); Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1252-54 (addressing claims brought without regard to
merits and unsuccessful claims brought for anticompetitive purposes); Federal Prescription
Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 262-63, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(adopting baseless, frivolous, or abuse of process standard), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928
(1982).
197 See supra part II.E.
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satisfy these legal and economic standards. Rather, individual cases
must be decided on their particular facts, and some cases will
present questions that the judge or jury must resolve as the finder
of fact.
B. Role of Intent
The courts have not fully delineated the role that a competitor's
intent or purpose should play for purposes of Noerr-Pennington
immunity. Part of the confusion stems from the Supreme Court's
earliest discussion of the immunity in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. Justice Black, writing for
the Court, indicated that the railroad lobbying efforts at issue in
that case were immune from antitrust liability even if the railroads'
actions were motivated solely by their desire to destroy or injure
the fledgling trucking industry. "It is neither unusual nor illegal
for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring
about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their
competitors.' 98 As long as the lobbying effort involved a genuine
effort to influence legislation, the railroads' actions were immu-
nized. The only zone of liability for lobbying would be a situation
in which the lobbying was conducted without any expectation of
success-a very unlikely scenario.
Applying this analysis to sham litigation presents a challenge.
There are four broad types of cases. The easiest case would be the
lawsuit that is brought for the legitimate purpose of seeking redress
and that is well grounded in law and fact. Obviously, no liability
would attach, regardless of whether the suit is ultimately successful
or not. At the other extreme, a case might be brought for illegiti-
mate reasons (creating entry barriers, delaying or deterring entry
of a competitor, or harming or destroying a competitor) and could
be groundless or frivolous. In this case, the lawsuit would fall
within the sham exception and could lead to antitrust liability,
assuming the other requisites for a Sherman Act violation.
The two intermediate cases present more difficult problems.
One is the groundless or frivolous lawsuit that appears to be
brought in good faith. Although the groundless nature of the suit
may be an indicator of bad faith, it is possible that a firm might
institute or maintain a lawsuit through mistake, poor legal counsel,




lack of proper investigation, or some other error. Should the
lawsuit fall within the sham exception? The result might depend
on the degree to which the claim was baseless and the manner in
which the party bringing the litigation behaved. Courts would be
skeptical of the party's claim of good faith if it protracted the
proceedings, if its reliance on counsel was unreasonable, or if the
circumstances otherwise weakened its claim of good faith.' 99 More-
over, under the frivolousness or baselessness standard that many
courts have adopted, 200 the party would not be immune from the
Sherman Act. This approach is also consistent with the objective
standard of reasonableness contained in Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 20
The last case, and perhaps the most difficult one, involves the
lawsuit that is well grounded in law and fact but that is brought
primarily for an illegitimate purpose. To bring the case close to
the Noerr fact pattern, suppose the firm bringing the lawsuit was
motivated solely by a desire to harm or destroy its competitor.
This type of evidence might be obtained by admission, by a "smok-
ing gun," or by overwhelming circumstantial evidence. In Noerr,
for example, a secretary apparently purloined more than 200 doc-
uments that demonstrated the anticompetitive nature of the railroad
lobbying campaign. The secretary sent these documents to the
truckers, along with a cover letter explaining their importance. 20 2
If the lawsuit is well grounded in law and fact (or is not
frivolous), should it be treated as "sham" because it was brought
or maintained for improper purposes? Under Noerr's approach to
lobbying, a firm could lawfully bring a claim against a competitor
solely for the purpose of injuring the competitor, as long as the
lawsuit was genuine, which would presumably mean that it was
well grounded in law and fact.2 3 Further, in United Mine Workers
- See Hurwitz, supra note 106, at 98-99 (discussing objective and subjective evidence
of intent).
See supra note 196.
FD ED. R. Civ. P. II ("The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by the signer ... that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law . . .")
(emphasis added); see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., -
U.S. -, III S. Ct. 922, 929-33 (1991) (discussing objective standard of reasonable
inquiry under Rule 11); GEORGENE M. VAio, RULE Il SA.cTxoNs: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES
AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES §§ 5.01-6.05, at 295-480 (Supp. 1991).
Im Minda, supra note 11, at 918 n.37 (citing The Railroad-Trucker Brawl, FORTUNE,
June 1953, at 139).
" See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
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v. Pennington, the Court indicated that "Noerr shields from the
Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials re-
gardless of intent or purpose.... Joint efforts to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to
eliminate competition. '" 204 California Motor Transport, however,
stresses the importance of intent in assessing the sham exception
in the litigation context. The Court noted: "Misrepresentations,
condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in
the adjudicatory process." 205 If a firm's litigation behavior consti-
tutes an abuse of process, the Court concluded that its actions
would not be immune from Sherman Act scrutiny. 2° The Supreme
Court placed additional emphasis on the role of the litigant's intent
in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, the sham litigation case
decided one year after California Motor Transport. The Otter Tail
Court noted that litigation brought with "the purpose of delaying
and preventing" entry can constitute sham.207
In California Motor Transport, the Court also expressed con-
cerns about the institution and maintenance of litigation regardless
of the merits.2 8 For example, if a firm engaged in a practice of
automatic protests to an administrative agency or immediate resort
to litigation whenever a competitor entered the market or competed
aggressively, the firm should be subject to antitrust liability even
though a few of those challenges had some merit or plausibility.
There would be strong circumstantial evidence from which a jury
could conclude that the litigation was sham, intended to produce
anticompetitive results completely separate from the outcome in
the courtroom. For instance, in Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Moun-
tain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc. ,29 one of the antitrust defendants
"would automatically protest any [proposed tariff rate for the
transportation of freight], regardless of the rate's legality or com-
petitive justification. "210 The court held that these protests, because
they were made without regard to their possible success, were
24 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
2-5 California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
21 See id.; see also Hurwitz, supra note 106, at 93 & n.122, 95 (discussing bad faith
concept of sham, as used in California Motor Transport).
2N See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379 (1973). The Court
noted that the sham exception may apply "where the purpose to suppress competition is
evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims." Id. at 380.
- See California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512.
11 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
210 Id. at 1253.
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therefore not intended to obtain relief from the regulatory body.




One of the major appellate decisions regarding sham litigation
is Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,212 an opinion by
Judge Richard Posner. The plaintiff, Grip-Pak, sought to enter
the market for plastic beverage holders used on "six-packs" of
beer and other drinks. Illinois Tool Works, the dominant firm in
the industry with a ninety percent market share, allegedly sought
to deter and eliminate competition through a variety of anticom-
petitive practices, including patent accumulation, threatened patent
litigation, three sham lawsuits, acquisition of a competitor, division
of markets, and filing a fraudulent patent application. 213 One of
Illinois Tool Works' lawsuits was brought against Grip-Pak, claim-
ing that Grip-Pak had misappropriated trade secrets.
For Noerr-Pennington purposes, the issue in the case was
whether it was necessary for the trade secret suit to be lacking in
probable cause for it to be the basis for Grip-Pak's antitrust claim.
Judge Posner concluded that a lawsuit brought for anticompetitive
purposes could be considered "sham" even though not wholly
lacking in merit:214 "[L]itigation could be used for improper pur-
poses even when there is probable cause for the litigation; and if
the improper purpose is to use litigation as a tool for suppressing
competition in its antitrust sense, it becomes a matter of antitrust
concern.' '215 In resolving this issue, the Seventh Circuit noted that
several courts had reached the same conclusion, although at least
one had not.21 6 Since 1982, several courts have followed Grip-Pak's
reasoning, although the circuits remain split. 217
211 See id. at 1254.
212 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
213 See Id. at 468.
214 See id. at 472-73.
225 Id. at 472.
226 Compare Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1004-07 (9th
Cir.) (holding that bad-faith lawsuit can violate antitrust law), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831
(1975) and Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424-25 (10th Cir.) (finding
violation based on showing of bad faith), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952) with Alexander
v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1200 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding that litigation
was not groundless, despite evidence of improper purpose), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937
(1983).
217 See In re Burlington N., 822 F.2d at 529-30 (holding that claim must have reasonable
basis and be brought in good faith to be immune); Sunergy Communities, Inc. v. Aristek
Properties, Ltd., 535 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Colo. 1982) (holding that success before a
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Another important Seventh Circuit decision is MCI Commu-
nications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,218 decided
one year after Grip-Pak. In that case, MCI brought a massive
antitrust suit against AT&T, alleging that the latter had engaged
in exclusionary practices to secure and maintain a monopoly in the
long-distance telephone market. The jury found that AT&T had
instituted tariff filings in a bad faith attempt to impose costs on
MCI and to eliminate it as a competitor.21 9 In affirming the jury's
determination, Judge Cudahy noted:
"Without a doubt, the intention to harm a competitor is not
sufficient to make litigation or administrative proceedings a sham.
That anticompetitive motive is the very matter protected under
Noerr-Pennington. Rather, the requisite motive for the sham
exception is the intent to harm one's competitors not by the result
of the litigation but by the simple fact of the institution of
litigation.' 22o
The Supreme Court, in its latest Noerr-Pennington decision, en-
dorsed this general approach, noting: "The 'sham' exception to
Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the govern-
mental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an
anticompetitive weapon.' ' 22
political or adjudicative body is only one factor to be considered); see also Clipper Exxpress,
690 F.2d at 1254 (holding that success or failure of litigation is not determinative of whether
party genuinely intended to seek redress); Federal Prescription Serv., 663 F.2d at 263 n.9
(discussing abuse of process based on improper motive). But see Columbia Pictures Indus.
v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding it impossible for plaintiff
to show bad faith because defendant's underlying litigation was successful); Razorback
Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 487-88 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding litigation
not sham, regardless of motive), .later proceeding, 817 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1987).
A case that ultimately found that the defendant engaged in sham litigation neglected
strong evidence of exclusionary intent because it believed certain legal claims were not "so
groundless as to come within the 'sham litigation' exception." Alexander, 687 F.2d at 1200.
This portion of Alexander is arguably inconsistent with Grip-Pak and-given the extensive
evidence of bad faith-seems to be incorrect. This opinion is less troubling only because it
found that other litigation and threatened suits by the same party did fall within the sham
exception. Id. at 1200-03.
21- 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
219 See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1157-
58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
Id. at 1156 (quoting City of Gainesville v. Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F.
Supp. 1258, 1265-66 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (emphasis in original)); cf. Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d
at 1255 ("[T]his activity, disguised as petitioning, is simply an effort to interfere directly
with a competitor.").
22 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct.
1344, 1354 (1991) (emphasis in original).
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The economic approach developed in this Article suggests that
a lawsuit brought with some probable cause may have both anti-
competitive effects and purposes. Judge Posner, writing in Grip-
Pak, seems to adopt a cost-benefit based approach:
Many claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for
their own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of
winning, would be too low to repay the investment in litigation.
Suppose a monopolist brought a tort action against its single,
tiny competitor; the action had a colorable basis in law; but in
fact the monopolist would never have brought the suit-its chances
of winning, or the damages it could hope to get if it did win,
were too small compared to what it would have to spend on the
litigation-except that it wanted to use pretrial discovery to dis-
cover its competitor's trade secrets; or hoped that the competitor
would be required to make public disclosure of its potential
liability in the suit and that this disclosure would increase the
interest rate that the competitor had to pay for bank financing;
or just wanted to impose heavy legal costs on the competitor in
the hope of deterring entry by other firms.m2
Thus, if institution of the lawsuit was not cost-justified, it might
have been brought for some other purpose, such as to exclude or
harm competition. This view is consistent with the underlying
concept of sham: a lawsuit is sham if the target is harmed primarily
by the institution and maintenance of the lawsuit, not by its ulti-
mate outcome or judgment. The lawsuit thus is not a genuine
effort to influence the governmentm and should not enjoy Noerr-
Pennington immunity.
Other courts have formulated a similar standaid using different
language. For example, the Second Circuit focuses on whether the
litigant had a "reasonable expectation" of obtaining relief.2A In
the Fifth Circuit, courts have indicated that Noerr immunity applies
"so long as a genuine desire for judicial relief is a significant
motivating factor underlying the suit."22 The Ninth Circuit has
indicated that the plaintiff must allege "some abuse of process,
although not necessarily access barring."2 6 And the District of
Columbia Circuit has indicated that sham means the litigation was
m Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 472.
- See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
- See Litton Sys., 700 F.2d at 810.
2 Coastal States Mktg., 694 F.2d at 1372.
Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1259.
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"baseless or frivolous," an abuse of process, or a denial of mean-
ingful access to the courtroom. 7
The approach taken in Rule 11 and related types of cases may
provide some guidance in resolving this issue. Under Rule 11, "The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer.., that [the pleading, motion, or paper] is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."'  As many
courts have recognized, a party or attorney can violate this portion
of Rule 11 even if the paper or pleading is not frivolous, because
it was still brought for an improper purpose.2 9 Similarly, a federal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, provides relief against attorneys for bad
faith tactics during litigation.2?0 Finally, many states recognize the
tort of abuse of process, under which a party can be liable for
litigation brought for improper purposes.? 1
Thus, a party can violate Rule 11 or § 1927, or commit the
tort of abuse of process, by filing or maintaining a colorable
lawsuit for an illegitimate purpose. By analogy, it can be argued
that litigation should not be immune from antitrust scrutiny if it
is brought primarily for an exclusionary purpose. To meet this
standard, the antitrust plaintiff must show more than the presence
of mixed motivations; if the lawsuit is brought partly to harm
competition, but also to vindicate a substantial right or to obtain
significant monetary or injunctive relief, then it is not sham. On
the other hand, if predation appears to be the sole or primary
227 See Federal Prescription Serv., 663 F.2d at 266.
=2 FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
See Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988); Szabo Food Serv., Inc.
v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988);
Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1130 (5th Cir. 1987); Whittington
v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 208 (E.D. Ky. 1987); cf. V~Ago, supra note 201, §
4.01[b][ii], at 203 (citing conflicting authorities). The Supreme Court recently held that
federal courts also have the inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith litigation. See
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132-33 (1991).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) ("Any attorney... who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such con-
duct."); United States v. Associated Convalescent Enters., 766 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that § 1927 requires showing of recklessness or bad faith).
231 See Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence
Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of
Process, 86 H~Av. L. REv. 715 (1973); see also Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1254-59
(holding that abuse of process falls within the sham exception). For a general discussion of
the tort of abuse of process, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 121, at 897-900 (5th ed. 1984).
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motivation behind the lawsuit-its raison d'8tre-then the sham
exception should be applied.
In evaluating this issue, courts should look to whether the
lawsuit was cost-justified for at least three reasons. First, the lack
of a reasonable likelihood of obtaining a sufficiently large recovery
to merit litigation is circumstantial evidence of predatory intent.
Why bring a lawsuit if it seems to be a losing cause from the start?
Second, if the plaintiff can adduce evidence that the real purpose
and effect of the litigation was to achieve discernable anticompe-
titive ends in the marketplace, then the inference of improper
purpose becomes even stronger. Third, from a societal point of
view, if the lawsuit costs more than it generates in the form of an
expected recovery, it probably should be discouraged.
This approach will not chill meritorious, good faith litigation.
If a lawsuit is successful or at least involves an arguable claim,
Noerr-Pennington immunity should presumptively apply. As sev-
eral courts have noted, success in the courtroom is a good indicator
of the party's good faith and of the genuineness of its petitioning
activity.2 2 Finally, most successful or arguable claims will ex ante
be warranted under the cost-benefit test because the likelihood of
recovery will justify the expected costs of the litigation.
C. Can One Lawsuit Constitute Sham?
Another unsettled Noerr-Pennington issue is whether a single
lawsuit (or administrative petition) can satisfy the sham exception.
The Supreme Court engendered some confusion in California Mo-
tor Transport when it discussed the contours of the sham exception.
According to Justice Douglas: "One claim, which a court or agency
may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude
that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused." 233
Most courts have interpreted Justice Douglas's discussion of the
sham exception as illustrative, rather than exhaustive. 234 This view
is almost certainly correct. A careful reading of California Motor
Transport indicates that Justice Douglas's mention of a "pattern
2 See Aydin, 718 F.2d at 903 ("Success or failure might be helpful as one indication
of [a party's] intent in bringing the action .... "); Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1254
(same); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841 n.13 (9th Cir. 1980) (same);
see also Bien, supra note 114, at 78-79.
2' California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
See, e.g., Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1252.
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of baseless, repetitive claims" was only an illustration of sham
litigation. His opinion includes a list of several specific forms of
litigation misconduct, such as perjury, patent fraud, and bribery.
It then notes that "[t]here are many other forms of illegal and
reprehensible practice" that may be unlawful,2 5 one of which
involves the pattern of litigation, which is what the antitrust plain-
tiffs had alleged in the instant case.2 6
Still, whether a single lawsuit is sufficient to establish "sham"
has not been decisively resolved. Courts in several circuits have
concluded that, in the proper circumstances, one lawsuit can suffice
to meet California Motor Transport's sham litigation exception2 7
These courts view a pattern of multiple lawsuits as highly persuasive
evidence, making it considerably easier for the antitrust plaintiff
to prove that the sham exception applies.28 A number of courts,
however, have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that one
lawsuit generally cannot constitute a sham. 2 9 Commentators, in
contrast, have almost uniformly endorsed the view that one lawsuit
can be sufficient to satisfy the sham exception. 240
23 See California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512-13.
See id. at 511-12.
2 See Aydin, 718 F.2d at 903; MCI Communications Corp., 708 F.2d at 1154-55;
Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 388 (9th Cir. 1983); Clipper
Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1254-57; Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 586
F.2d 530, 543 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); First Nat'l Bank, 482
F. Supp. at 520.
See, e.g., Coastal States Mktg., 694 F.2d at 1369 n.37; Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d
at 1255 n.22.
39 Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
that pattern of baseless, repetitive claims required under California Motor Transport);
Hydro-Tech, 673 F.2d at 1177 ("A sham action ... is something more than an action
instituted without probable cause."); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 612 F.
Supp. 654, 663 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that single suit would be insufficient), aff'd on
other grounds, 792 F.2d 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986); MCI Commu-
nications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1103 (N.D. Ill.) (requiring
a series of claims), aff'd on other grounds, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 971 (1979); Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n, 428 F. Supp. at 955-56 (holding that
claims must have been repetitive); Central Bank v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167
(E.D. Mo. 1976) (holding that one lawsuit was insufficient), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); see also Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co., 761 F.2d
at 487 (holding that single suit does not fall within sham exception absent evidence of access
barring, i.e., ethical misconduct); Omni Resource Dev. Corp. v. Conoco, Inc., 739 F.2d
1412, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring showing of pattern of litigation or grave miscon-
duct); Handgards, 601 F.2d at 996 (requiring pattern of baseless litigation and access*
barring); First Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. at 521 (holding that single suit is not sham, absent
evidence of ethical misconduct, defined as perjury, fraud, or bribery).
24 See Balmer, supra note 195, at 55-56; Fischel, supra note 22, at 109-10; Hurwitz,
supra note 106, at 101 & n.161 (citing several commentators).
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There are several strong arguments supporting the view that
one lawsuit can be sufficient to satisfy the sham exception. First,
later Supreme Court precedent indicates that four of the Justices
have expressly endorsed this view. In Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend
Corp.,2" the Supreme Court addressed the scope of a federal
court's power to enjoin state court proceedings under the antitrust
laws, in light of the Anti-Injunction Act's general prohibition
against such injunctions .42 The Court was badly divided on the
issues in the case, but two of the Justices' opinions addressed
predatory litigation issues. Justice Stevens, dissenting as to the
Anti-Injunction Act issues and writing for three other Justices,
specifically indicated that a single lawsuit can fall within the sham
exception to Noerr-Pennington.23 Only Justice Blackmun, joined
in a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger, found that a
single lawsuit was insufficient and that a "pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims" must be alleged.2A Justice Rehnquist's three-
Justice plurality opinion did not clearly address the issue. 5  Several
courts and commentators have read Vendo to imply that a single
lawsuit can fall within the sham exception.46 At a minimum, Vendo
indicates that California Motor Transport did not resolve the sin-
gle-suit issue and that the view expressed here has considerable
support among the Justices.
Second, there is nothing in the economic model of predatory
litigation suggesting that more than one lawsuit would be necessary
for a dominant firm to achieve its anticompetitive purpose. Al-
though repeated litigation may be needed in order to fend off
several rivals or to successfully attack one strong rival, there are
many situations in which one lawsuit would accomplish the domi-
nant firm's goal. In fact, each of the possible goals of predatory
litigation can be satisfied by the use of a single suit. If the anti-
competitive suit is sufficiently burdensome, a dominant firm can
eliminate a competitor, discipline a rival, raise a rival's costs, or
-1 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
1,1 See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
2" See id. at 645 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
24s See id. at 635 n.6 (discussing California Motor Transport but not addressing the
single-suit issue). Justices Stewart and Powell joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
2" See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1154; First Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. at 520 (citing cases);
Balmer, supra note 195, at 49-56; see also Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1256 n.24 (discussing
Vendo and concluding that a single suit can be sufficient).
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delay or deter entry of new competition. Indeed, if the dominant
firm's strategy is particularly successful in deterring further chal-
lenges, no additional predatory lawsuits will be necessary.
Finally, as several courts have recognized, a pattern of baseless
litigation, although not necessary or essential for proof of sham,
is still highly persuasive evidence that the antitrust defendant's
actions fall within the sham exception. 247
Some commentators and litigants contend that to allow a find-
ing of sham based on the filing of one baseless lawsuit provides
insufficient protection to the exercise of the First Amendment right
to petition.24 This argument implicitly assumes that the First
Amendment requires a firm to get a "free bite at the apple," an
unsanctioned opportunity to litigate against a target firm, regard-
less of the merits. This notion is foreign to constitutional analysis,
for there is no reason why a single lawsuit cannot be abusive and
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment. Although the threat
of antitrust liability can have a chilling effect on the exercise of
First Amendment rights, the solution is to have heightened protec-
tion for the exercise of those rights. Thus, in the defamation area,
the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan249 precludes liability
for defamatory statements made regarding public officials and
public figures absent a showing of actual malice. Similarly, in the
antitrust field, a firm is not liable for its petitioning activity absent
a showing of sham. In both areas, the focus is on the heightened
standard for liability, not on a requirement that the unlawful
activity be repeated in order for constitutional immunity to cease.
Once the antitrust plaintiff demonstrates that the litigation was
initiated or conducted in bad faith and with predatory intent, the
defendant's actions should be stripped of First Amendment pro-
tection.210
A practical difficulty with the use of a single lawsuit as a basis
for a finding of sham is that it presents heightened evidentiary
problems. It is certainly easier to discern an anticompetitive pur-
241 See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, 586 F.2d at 546 n.6.
24 See, e.g., Christina M. Spitzer, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 345-47 (1984). Spitzer's argument is based on her
view that liability for a single act of petitioning will have a chilling effect unless the single
act involves illegality or access barring. See id. at 351. The argument was also made in
Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Foundation, Inc., 783 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Rickards, 783 F.2d at 1334; Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1261-62.
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pose when there has been a pattern of baseless claims. Still, a
single lawsuit can be brought with anticompetitive intent and can
wreak havoc on the victim of the lawsuit. Moreover, if the pred-
atory lawsuit successfully deters other potential competitors (or
disciplines existing competitors), the dominant firm will have no
reason to bring another lawsuit. In some of the worst cases of
predatory litigation, therefore, there may be no pattern of baseless
claims upon which comfortably to reach a conclusion that the
sham exception should apply.
An example of a case in which a single lawsuit should generally
not be the basis for a claim of sham is a situation in which a party
has secured a patent from the Patent & Trademark Office. Assum-
ing that the patent was not obtained fraudulently or in bad faith,
the patent holder should be allowed an opportunity to enforce its
patent in federal court. Even if that court ultimately finds that the
patent should never have been granted and that the incumbent
firm's patent claim is thus without merit, the firm should not
suffer from antitrust liability for seeking enforcement of a facially
valid patent.21 On the other hand, if the patent is obtained by
fraud on the patent office, then one illegitimate patent infringement
suit should be enough to invoke the Sherman Act.52
The patent example may, however, be somewhat unique be-
cause the Patent Office serves as a gitekeeper, preventing obviously
baseless patent applications from receiving approval.23 In other
areas, in which there is little or no screening by an entity like the
Patent Office, the justification for allowing a "first bite at the
apple" seems weaker. For instance, no government entity places
its imprimatur on trade secret claims before those claims wind up
in court. The single trade secret claim may be clearly baseless,
brought solely for exclusionary purposes. Similarly, although the
Copyright Office accepts applications for copyright protection,
there is practically no review on the merits prior to issuance of
copyright certificates. When there is little or no oversight by an
impartial (and governmental) third party, the case for allowing
1' Cf. Handgards, 601 F.2d at 992-96 (discussing predatory patent litigation).
2 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
"I See generally PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FuNDAmENTALs §§ 15.01-.15 (2d
ed. 1990) (discussing patent application, examination, and appeal process). On the other
hand, Patent Office proceedings are generally exparte, and its decisions involve conclusions




antitrust scrutiny is solid, assuming the target firm can meet the
evidentiary hurdles in proving its claim.
Another situation in which a single lawsuit might not be deemed
a sham is a case brought to vindicate a legitimate principle of law.
If a firm accused of predatory litigation can demonstrate that it
brought the lawsuit in a good-faith attempt to vindicate a legal
principle, it should escape liability even though the lawsuit may
not have been justifiable on a strict cost-benefit basis. For example,
a firm might bring a trade secret suit based on the taking of
proprietary information by "improper means." The suit fails be-
cause the court takes a narrow view of "improper means," but
the court acknowledges that the plaintiff's broader approach is
plausible. Although this lawsuit may have had limited monetary
potential, the plaintiff should be able to demonstrate that it sought-
in a single case-to expand trade secret law in good faith. If the
firm can make this showing, it should not be liable for predatory
litigation.
D. Standard of Proof and Pleading Requirements
Two final issues of considerable importance are the standards
of proof and pleading that the antitrust plaintiff must meet in
order to invoke the sham exception. Courts place the burden of
proving sham on the plaintiffP 4 but are divided regarding whether
the plaintiff must meet a preponderance standard or a stricter
standard, such as clear and convincing evidence.
Several courts have held that the antitrust plaintiff must estab-
lish sham by clear and convincing evidence, at least in cases where
the underlying claim involves enforcement of a patentY 5 Although
the patent law and First Amendment considerations these courts
express are serious, they do not warrant application of a higher
burden of proof on antitrust plaintiffs. The standards for proving
sham litigation are already fairly strict, requiring at a minimum
that the plaintiff prove the litigation was abusive, frivolous, or
brought in bad faith. A plaintiff that can adduce evidence of this
25" See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
21 See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 849-50 (Ist Cir. 1985) (noting that,
in cases involving patent litigation, courts require clear and convincing evidence that patent
was fraudulently obtained or sought), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same); Handgards, 601 F.2d at 996




nature, combined with evidence of a substantive antitrust violation,
should be entitled to prevail if it meets the preponderance standard.
As the Supreme Court has noted, sham litigation "by definition
does not involve a bona fide grievance, [and therefore] it does not
come within the first amendment right to petition. ' ' 2 6 The Fifth
Circuit, citing the major Supreme Court cases in the area, has
noted that none of those decisions indicates the need for a higher
burden of proof.27
Another hurdle that some courts have placed on antitrust claims
based on predatory litigation is a heightened pleading standard.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires "more specific allegations
than would otherwise be required,"' ' 5 in predatory litigation cases
because of the potential chilling effect that antitrust liability might
have on petitioning activity protected by the First "Amendment.
This view is troubling because it creates a new exception to the
rules of pleading in federal court. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides the general rule of notice pleading. 9
Rule 9(b) contains a list of exceptions to the general rule; matters
falling under Rule 9(b) must be pled with specificity.3 Courts that
have fashioned a special exception to the normal pleading rules are
engrafting an additional exception to Rule 8(a) even though an
exclusive list of exceptions is already provided in the Federal Rules.
As a matter of policy and legal interpretation, the approach taken
in these cases seems wrong. The better view, as expressed in a
number of decisions,2' is that the normal pleading requirements
of Rule 8(a) apply to allegations of sham litigation. The normal
pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) still require that the antitrust
plaintiff allege the facts entitling it to relief; a conclusory allegation
of "sham" would be insufficient to withstand a motion to dis-
11 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (quoting
Balner, supra note 195, at 60). In essence, the Court views sham litigation as one of several
categories of unprotected activity, such as false and defamatory statements.
2" See Feminist Women's Health Ctr., 586 F.2d at 543 n.6.
2" Franchise Realty, 542 F.2d at 1083.
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall
contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief. . . ."); see also Franchise Realty, 542 F.2d at 1089 (Browning, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority's adoption of special pleading rule).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.").
261 See, e.g., Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 507 F. Supp. 939, 943-44 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (applying Rule 8(a) and citing other decisions); MCI, 462 F. Supp. at 1102.
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miss.2 2 The normal pleading rules thus provide sufficient notice to
the defendant and protection of the First Amendment interests
recognized in Noerr-Pennington.
E. Proposed Screening Devices
The greatest virtue of the predatory pricing test that Philip
Areeda and Donald Turner developed in 1975263 is its relative
simplicity. Their benchmark for determining whether a price is
predatory is based on the firm's average variable cost, as opposed
to the theoretical concept of marginal cost. Because the Areeda-
Turner test focuses upon a measurable variable, it provides a fairly
effective rule of decision for the courts. For the same reason, the
test gives businesses ex ante guidance concerning the likely legal
treatment of their courses of action. The test has generally been
well received by courts and commentators. 264
It would be desirable to have similar screening devices for
assessing sham litigation, to minimize the amount of argument
over whether an earlier suit constitutes a sham. 265 Such screening
devices can be derived from the cost-benefit test described in this
Article. In particular, the strength of the underlying (and allegedly
sham) claim and the likelihood of anticompetitive gain should be
evaluated.
1. Strength of the Underlying Claim
a. Successful Litigation
If the underlying litigation was successful, it is difficult to
imagine that a court would conclude that it was predatory. Unless
there is evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, perjury, or similar
misconduct, successful litigation should be conclusively presumed
to be immune from the Sherman Act.
See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 172-73 (D. Del.
1979) (dismissing parts of a claim of sham petitioning alleged in conclusory terms).
21 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 68, at 732-33.
2" See supra note 68.




b. Litigation That Survives Motions for Summary Judgment or
for Directed Verdict
If the underlying litigation survives a motion for summary
judgment or directed verdict, it probably presents a legitimate claim
for relief. Such litigation should enjoy a rebuttable presumption
of legality, which could be overcome by evidence of fraud, misrep-
resentation, perjury, or improper purpose. Partial success in the
courtroom, unless it is the product of improper or unethical tac-
tics,26 should immunize the litigant from later antitrust liability.
For example, in Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc. ,267
the Tenth Circuit was faced with an antitrust counterclaim based
on Coors's attempt to enforce territorial and customer limitations
against a distributor. The court held that Coors's attempt to en-
force these restrictions was not sham in light of Continental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,20 the Supreme Court's then-recent
decision recognizing that these types of vertical restrictions are
often legitimate and procompetitive. 269
The Supreme Court, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 270 a labor case involving claims of sham litigation, indicated
that surviving summary judgment may immunize a party from
liability, at least under federal labor law. In the antitrust context,
if the underlying litigation involved a genuine dispute over material
facts, the litigation should be presumed genuine. Still, the antitrust
plaintiff should be given an opportunity to establish that the liti-
gation was brought for anticompetitive purposes or that the plain-
tiff survived the motion for summary judgment by resorting to
improper tactics, such as fraud, misrepresentation, or perjury.271
c. Litigation Resolved By Summary Judgment or Dismissal
Motions
If the underlying litigation ends on a successful motion for
summary judgment or for dismissal on the pleadings, the litigation
For examples of cases involving allegations of unethical practices, see Clipper
Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1247, 1252 n.17, 1259-63 (involving submission of false information);
Alexander, 687 F.2d at 1205 (involving destruction of documents).
561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977).
- 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
See Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 812 (10th Cir.
1977).
270 461 U.S. 731, 745-46 (1983).
-1 In particular, the non-movant may have avoided summary judgment through self-
serving, if not false, affidavits. See supra note 159.
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may have heightened potential for being predatory. This result
would be persuasive evidence of sham litigation, particularly if the
predatory firm had brought more than one unmeritorious suit.
d. Litigation in Violation of Rule 11
At the other extreme, litigation that violates Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or one of the companion rules
and similar statutory provisions)272 should be presumed to be sham,
absent a showing that the violation was unrelated to the antitrust
claim or was not substantial. If the litigation was frivolous or was
conducted in bad faith in violation of Rule 11, it should also be
deemed a sham for Noerr-Pennington purposes.
This rule would not transform every Rule 1 1 violation into a
claim under the Sherman Act-it would merely remove the cloak
of Noerr immunity, allowing the antitrust plaintiff to proceed to
prove the other elements of a section 2 Sherman Act claim (such
as market definition, monopoly power, and exclusionary behavior).
2. Likelihood of Anticompetitive Gain
The likelihood of anticompetitive gain would be probative in
assessing whether the antitrust defendant's litigation activity was
predatory. First, market conditions must be favorable to the ac-
quisition or maintenance of monopoly power or power over price.
Thus, the plaintiff should be required to adduce evidence of market
definition, market power, and barriers to entry.
Second, the plaintiff should be required to show that the liti-
gation is in some manner exclusionary. The simple fact that a
firm's behavior in court was unjustified does not mean that the
litigation is exclusionary in the marketplace. The plaintiff should
be required to show that the litigation had the effect-actual or
potential-of excluding competition in the relevant market. In some
cases, this evidence will be obvious, such as the case of an incum-
bent firm that attempts to entangle potential competitors in a
morass of regulatory and administrative challenges designed to
prevent the entrants from obtaining licenses or other prerequisites
for entering the market. On the other hand, the mere institution
of a lawsuit that imposes costs on a competitor but that has not
27 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g) (governing discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (same);
see also supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
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had significant effect in the marketplace should not fall within the
domain of the Sherman Act. If every baseless lawsuit against a
competitor (or other market participant) could be transformed into
an antitrust claim, the Sherman Act would become a partial fee-
shifting statute, rather than a charter of free competition.
Judge Frank Easterbrook has argued that predatory behavior
typically takes one of two forms. 273 One is predatory pricing, in
which one would expect to see prices fall initially, then rise once
rivals have been driven away or disciplined. The other strategy,
which is relevant to predatory litigation, involves raising rivals'
costs. In this case, Easterbrook argues, one would expect to see
market prices increase, output to fall, and the predator's market
share to rise.274 In identifying a case of predatory litigation, one
would expect these indicia to be present. Thus, the plaintiff should
come forward with evidence of market performance that reflects
the increased prices, reduced output, and increase in the predator's
market share. This evidence not only helps establish the elements
of a section 2 violation, but also goes a long way toward estab-
lishing that the plaintiff suffered harm as a result of the strategy. 275
CONCLUSION
As Philip Areeda and Donald Turner have observed, ordinary
contract and tort complaints should not be transformed into anti-
trust claims.2 7 6 This observation can be extended to cases in which
plaintiffs seek antitrust remedies as a method of fee shifting or
otherwise to compensate themselves for defending an unsuccessful
lawsuit. At the same time, there can be no doubt that litigation
can be an anticompetitive tool. The need, then, is for a legal
standard that allows treble damage recoveries when a firm's liti-
gation activities palpably harm competition. The "sham" exception
to Noerr-Pennington provides courts and private parties with only
a general principle-genuine litigation efforts are immune from the
Sherman Act, while non-genuine or sham lawsuits are not. Not
surprisingly, courts have had considerable difficulty in defining the
27 See Easterbrook,.supra note 63, at 974.
24 See id.
'7 All of these screening devices are consistent with the elements of a section 2 Sherman
Act violation, which requires a showing of market power and exclusionary behavior. See
supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.




circumstances in which litigation activity should be subject to anti-
trust scrutiny.
This Article has developed an economic model of predatory
litigation. Predatory litigation can serve several possible anticom-
petitive functions, including eliminating competitors, disciplining
competitors, raising rivals' costs, and delaying or deterring entry
into a market. When a litigant brings suit for one of these reasons,
rather than to prevail in the courtroom, the suit is predatory and
threatens competition. Litigation can be as effective as any other
strategy of predation, and it may be less costly and harder to
penalize than other forms of price or non-price predation. In
particular, a dominant firm may be able to impose asymmetrical
costs on its target because litigation can be costly to defend and
difficult to resolve summarily.
A cost-benefit test can assist courts to identify exclusionary liti-
gation. If the present value of the expected recovery, discounted by
the probability of victory, is less than the cost of litigation, then a
rational firm would normally not bring suit. A dominant firm may
sue, however, if it expects to get a competitive advantage meiely
from the filing and prosecution of the suit. As a general matter,
litigation that is frivolous or that is brought primarily for an improper
purpose will not be cost-justified unless anticompetitive consequences
of the suit increase the predator's expected return.
The sham litigation exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity
should permit antitrust scrutiny in these cases. Litigation that is
frivolous or brought in bad faith should not be immune. Courts
should not require antitrust plaintiffs to make any additional show-
ing, such as a "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims," "access
barring," or fraud, in order to invoke the sham exception.
Finally, this Article suggests a number of screening devices to
assist courts and private parties in identifying predatory litigation.
These screening devices attempt to distinguish between situations
in which predatory litigation is probable and those in which the
litigation is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects or motivations.
These devices focus on the strength of the underlying litigation and
on characteristics of the relevant market. A claim of predatory
litigation is plausible if the underlying suit or suits were baseless
and if the litigation gave the predatory firm some competitive
advantage over the target firm. If the plaintiff's antitrust claim
satisfies these screening devices and meets the flexible test for the
sham exception suggested above, it is likely that the defendant's
litigation tactics were anticompetitive and should be deterred.
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